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The next time Apollo "caught at love," he sought to get love back
by promising to teach Cassandrathe art of prophecy. He kept his
promise, but Cassandrastill refused to be his lover. Divine gifts,
once given, cannot be withdrawn, so Apollo's revenge was that she
could keep her gift ofprophecy but that no one would believe her.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Like the conflicted Cassandra, an employer in the new millennium
will face a baffling legal predicament. Advances in genetic research
could potentially enable the employer to "predict the future" by providing him with information regarding the genetic make-up of current and
prospective employees. Equipped with this crystal ball, the employer
might be able to foresee the possibility that certain employees will incur
costly and debilitating diseases or that they will fall victim to substance
addiction, mental illness, or criminal propensities. But, as in the myth of
Cassandra, without clear guidance on the legal and ethical use of this
gift, the gift will prove to be virtually useless. Under the statutory restrictions imposed by the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 and its successor,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 3 an employer
will not be able to use this information to make employment decisions
without risking liability for employment discrimination.
However, closing one's eyes to this information will be equally
problematic. Under the common law doctrines of negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent entrustment, an employer may be held responsible to third parties for the damage or injuries caused by an employee's illness or dangerous propensity that the employer could have
anticipated and prevented. The employer of the next millennium, therefore, will face the prospect of liability for failing to act on the genetic
information he is statutorily preempted from accessing.
Part I of this Note gives an overview of past experiments with genetic predisposition and determinism, including the quest for the
"perfect person" embodied by the "Eugenic Movement" of the late
1.

ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, THE GODS OF GREECE 50 (1993).

2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the quest for the "perfect
worker" undertaken by American employers since the 1940s. Part II examines the origins, goals, organization, and progress of the Human
Genome Project, including the ethical and legal considerations raised by
its findings. Part I of this Note reviews existing state and federal legislation and administrative regulations to examine their sufficiency in
providing guidelines for the use of genetic information in the workplace.
Using existing anti-discriminatory statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions, Part IV of the Note analyzes the "Cassandra Complex," an employer's liability for either using or ignoring available genetic information. Finally, Part V presents recommendations to the employer on
preparing for the advent of the genetic workplace.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The EugenicMovement: The Questfor the "Perfect Person"

The quest for the perfect person found its political expression in the
Eugenic Movement, which swept across the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Developed as a theory in 1883,
"eugenics" is described as the science of improving the human race by
the careful selection of parents.4 French scientist Sir Francis Galton, a
cousin of Charles Darwin,5 expounded the first theories of modem
eugenics in the late 1800s.6 Creating the term eugenics from the Greek
root meaning "well born," Galton maintained that "afflictions [such] as
mental retardation, mental illness and criminality were incurable hereditary defects, and that measures preventing reproduction by those with
such undesirable characteristics would eliminate many social problems."7 By the turn of the century, Galton's ideas on individual heredity
had been expanded by his colleagues to include the concept that each

4. See Eric M. Jaegers, Note, Modem JudicialTreatment of ProcreativeRights of Developmentally Disabled Persons:Equal Rights to Procreationand Sterilization, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM.L. 947, 950 (1993); see also George P. Smith, n1, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy,
1985 S.ILL. U. L.J. 435, 437 (1985) (defining "eugenics" as an "approach designed to give 'the
more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable
than they otherwise would have had') (quoting Comment, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A
Cure for Mediocrity?,94 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1852 (1981)).
5. See Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How FairIs the Comparison?,in GENE
MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 57, 59 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds.,

1992).
6. See Jaegers, supranote 4, at 950.
7. Id.
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individual's germ cells were "'part of a continuous stream of germplasm

which has been in existence ever since the appearance of life on the
globe, and which is destined to continue in existence as long as life remains on the globe."' 8 In this expansive context, the concern of geneticists shifted from the individual's genetic traits to the "pools" of traits
specific to race, nationality, or economic position.9 In the early part of
the twentieth century, Galton's theories took root and flourished in a
number of countries including-the United States, England, and Germany.10
In the United States, the political unrest and economic change of
the 1870s and 1880s, as well as the xenophobic sentiment that followed
World War I, produced fertile ground for the growth of the Eugenic
Movement in early 1900s." Eugenicists, supported by "scientific" evidence that intelligence and personality traits were genetically inheritable, 2 maintained that society could actively improve itself by discour-

aging the reproductive capacity of its undesirable members and by
encouraging reproduction of the desirable ones. 3 Individuals considered
unfit because of criminal backgrounds, low intelligence, or abuse of alcohol or drugs were targeted for negative eugenics-the effort "to eradicate the socially inadequate germplasm from the American stock."' 4 Ultimately, the "unfit" label expanded to include individuals with physical
deformities, diseases such as epilepsy,5 syphilis, tuberculosis, or leprosy,
and people of poor economic means.1
8. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. FundamentalValues?, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1418, 1422 (1981) (quoting PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED
EUGENICS 25 (1918)).
9. See id. at 1421.
10. See Daniel J. Kevles, Eugenics and the Human Genome Project: Is the Past Prologue?,
in JusTIcE AND THE HuMAN GENOME PRoffcr 14, 15 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds.,
1994). Spurred by their American counterparts, German scientists, funded by the Nazi government,
conducted substantial research into genetics. See Proctor, supra note 5, at 59-61. Racial hygiene,
the care for germinal health, was pronounced a primary medical responsibility. See id. In Germany,
as in the United States, eugenic policies were first implemented by forced sterilizations. See id.
11. See Cynkar, supra note 8, at 1423.
12. As their scientific basis, eugenicists used the work of Gregor Mendel, who developed
genetic ratios through his experiments with crossbreeding peas. See id. at 1421. At a time when
knowledge of genetics was in its infancy, eugenicists used these ratios to support their theories of
the inheritability of individual characteristics and psychological traits. See id.
13. See Jaegers, supra note 4, at 950; see also Jana Leslie-Miller, From Bell to Bell: Responsible Reproduction in the Twentieth Century, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 124
(1997) (commenting that the science of eugenics "justified discrimination on the basis of race,
class, and sex").
14. Cynkar, supranote 8, at 1428.
15. See James E. Bowman, Genetics and African Americans, 27 SErON HALL L. REV. 919,
922 (1997). Immigrants from "undesirable racial stocks," such as the early twentieth century
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The negative eugenic policies demanded that those with inferior
germplasm be rendered incapable of producing offspring to ensure that
their deleterious genes would not have an opportunity to further "infect"
society.16 To implement these policies, eugenicists proposed the establishment of a nationwide plan of mandatory, long-term care in custodial
institutions for the genetically unfit. The advent in the 1890s of the
salpingectomy and the vasectomy, relatively simple procedures to prevent reproduction, allowed eugenicists to advocate sterilization as a
"more humane" method of accomplishing the eugenic goals.
The Eugenic Movement found legislative expression in the enact-

ment of state sterilization laws. Starting with Indiana in 1907, thirty
states passed compulsory sterilization laws by 1940, resulting in approximately 50,000 procedures by the end of World War 1fl1 Sterilization laws were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1927 in the landmark

waves of Eastern Europeans, were also targeted for negative eugenic policies. See Proctor, supra
note 5, at 61. The testimonies of prominent eugenicists were influential in the enactment of the
Immigration Restriction Act of 1924, which effectively reduced the flow of immigrants to the
United States by 95 percent. See id.
16. See Cynkar,supra note 8, at 1428-30.
17. See id. at 1429. Positive eugenics, or the promotion of the reproduction of the "fit," offered financial incentives for the increased reproduction of "fitter families." See Proctor, supra
note 5,at 60. The manifestations of positive eugenics were significantly more benign than those of
negative eugenics. The American Eugenic Society, established in 1923, mounted eugenic exhibits
at state fairs, proudly exhibiting "superior" individuals in their "human stock" pavilion. The winners of the Fitter Family competitions, in the three categories of small, medium and large, were
awarded medals declaring them "Grade A Individuals." Although the criteria for selection are unclear, all of the hopeful competitors were required to take an intelligence quotient ("IQ") test and
the Wvassermann test for syphilis. See Kevles, supra note 10, at 17. The choice instrument for
measuring intelligence in these genetic competitions was the Binet-Simon intelligence test, whose
validity was seriously in question by 1919. See Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a
Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of ConstitutionalLaw, 71 lowA L. REV. 833, 851 n.125
(1986).
18. See Proctor, supra note 5, at 61. In 1910, the Attorney General from California, U.S.
webb, explained that the targets of the "sterilization program" in his state were "'[m]ost of the
insane, epileptic, imbecile, idiotic, sexual perverts; many of the confirmed inebriates, prostitutes,
tramps and criminals, as well as the habitual paupers found in our country poor-asylums."' LeslieMiller, supra note 13, at 130-31. He also declared that many children in orphan homes belong to
the class knovni as degenerates. See id.
at 131. Forced sterilization as a condition for release from
mental institutions was justified by the president of the Medical Association of the State of Alabama who argued that "'it [was] not humane to allow the insane to propagate his species to the
injury of himself and the public."' Id. at 130. Unfortunately, due to the lack of knowledge regarding mental illness, the residents of mental institutions included recovering alcoholics, people with
mild cases of epilepsy, and those with low IQ scores, who, in today's context, would hardly be
classified as insane. See id. While American states were busy legislating sterilization laws, Nazi
Germany enacted its own version in 1933, the Law for the Protection of Genetically Diseased Offspring, resulting in approximately 350,000 forced sterilizations by the end of the Nazi regime. See
Proctor, supra note 5, at 61.
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case of Buck v. Bell, 9 the Court's first consideration of the constitutionality of state sterilization statutes. The reluctant plaintiff was Carrie
Buck, a seventeen-year-old girl from Appalachia "who had a funny
drawl and who perpetrated the sin of having a child out of wedlock."20
The Supreme Court upheld the Virginia sterilization law as a valid exercise of state police power.2 The distinguishing feature of the case was
Justice Holmes' positive endorsement of eugenic theories, according
more weight to the rights of society as a whole than to Buck's individual
procreative rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Justice Holmes
concluded: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute

degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their
2
kin..... Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
Beginning in the 1930s, there was a gradual decline of support for
eugenic theories.' Increased scientific understanding of mental retardation disproved the theoretical foundations of eugenics by proposing that
the majority of mental illness is not inheritable.2' Secondly, the outcome
of the Nazi eugenic movement-the atrocities promoted by Adolf Hit-

19. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
20. Leslie-Miller, supra note 13, at 128. Buck was committed to the State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded in Lynchburg, Virginia by her guardian, Mrs. Dobbs, who, upon discovering that Buck was pregnant, determined that the institution would be best able to handle her
"unmanageable and promiscuous" behavior. See Cynkar, supra note 8, at 1437; see also Dudziak,
supra note 17, at 848 (finding that the State of Virginia sought to prevent "propagation" by people
it felt "mentally defective and socially inadequate"). Buck, like her mother who was institutionalized in the same colony, was classified as hereditarily feebleminded and was determined to have
passed on her genetic disorder to her illegitimate offspring. The lower court found that Buck was
the "'probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring,"' and that she could be "'sterilized
without detriment to her general health."' Leslie-iller, supra note 13, at 128. This conclusory
statement was based on evidence such as Buck's low score on the Binet-Simon intelligence test,
her pregnancy, and hearsay from institution staff members. See id. Subsequent history proved that
both Buck and her mother were of average intelligence, and that her daughter was a second grade
honor roll student before dying at the age of eight. See Jaegers, supra note 4, at 957.
21. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 200.
22. See Leslie-Miller, supranote 13, at 129.

23. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. Justice Holmes, a social Darwinist at heart, was a believer in the
possibility for science to breed a better race of human beings. This belief, in conjunction with his
view that state legislatures and Congress should be left free to conduct social experimentation,
combined to create his strong rhetoric in Buck v. Bell. See Dudziak, supra note 17, at 856. In his
short opinion, Justice Holmes saw fit to cite only one case and saw no need to carefully ponder the
constitutional arguments. See id. at 858. He subsequently declared that the Buck decision was
"'[o]ne decision that I wrote [that] gave me pleasure."' Id. at 859; see also Cynkar, supra note 8, at
1443-45 (discussing Justice Holmes' opinion in Buck v. Bel).
24. See Jaegers, supra note 4, at 954.
25. See id. at 955.
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ler--chilled American enthusiasm for eugenic theories."' Finally, procreative autonomy began to emerge as a fundamental right.27 Although
not explicitly overruling Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court in 1941 articulated its opposition to involuntary sterilization in Skinner v. Oklahoma,2
declaring that the state's unequal application of sterilization in the
criminal context was a constitutional violation and holding that procreation is a fundamental right.29
B. Eugenics in the United States Workplace:
The Questfor the "Perfect Worker"
The quest for the perfect person, dismissed by American society in
the 1940s, found new expression in the quest for the perfect worker in
the decades following World War II. Technological advancements in the
post-war industrial explosion, especially the introduction of many new
chemicals in the workplace reignited the interest in eugenics. However,
this time the interest centered on identifying workers whose genetic
makeup would be best suited to withstand increased exposure to industrial toxins.
After World War II, several large employers established medical
screening programs to identify employees whose genetic makeup might
render them "hyper-susceptible" to workplace toxins. These early industrial eugenic experiments would prove to be as misguided as the social
eugenic policies of prior decades. Under the guise of extending workplace protection, these policies openly discriminated against workers
with little valid scientific support and with even less consideration for
the potential detrimental impact upon the lives of the individuals
tested.3"
26. See id.
27. See id. at 957.
28. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). This Supreme Court case challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act requiring compulsory sterilization of individuals convicted of two or more felonies involving "moral turpitude." See id. at 536. Disputing the contention that criminal tendencies are heritable, the Court concluded that the statute violated "the most
elementary notions of due process." Id. at 545.
29. See id. at 541.
30. Genetic testing in industry takes two forms: genetic screening and genetic monitoring, or
cytogenetics. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASsESsMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC MONrrORING AND
SCREENING INTHE WORKPLACE 1 (1990) [hereinafter GENETIC MoNrrORING AND SCREENING].
Genetic monitoring involves periodic exams of current employees to evaluate modifications in
their genetic material, such as chromosomal damage or molecular mutation, which occur in the
course of their employment. See id. Genetic monitoring targets the entire active workforce and its
focus is the identification of environmental workplace risks that can be reduced through the implementation of prevention programs. See id. at 2. Genetic screening, on the other hand, involves

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998
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Discriminatory treatment of workers on the basis of the results of
sickle cell screening and enzyme testing illustrates both the dangers in-

herent in stereotyping workers without valid medical or scientific justification and the potential liability for employers in either accessing or
ignoring the results of genetic tests. An examination of the ethical and
legal problems that arose with these exclusionary policies serves as a
preview of the potential problems that may face an employer when genetic testing becomes readily available.
1. Sickle Cell Screening
As early eugenicists postulated, many genetic traits are prevalent in
specific races and nationalities, making genetic exclusionary policies

particularly stigmatizing to certain segments of society." Sickle cell
anemia is an inherited blood disorder in which red blood cells become
sickled, or crescent shaped, causing physical symptoms of varying severity. 2 The disease manifests itself in homozygous individuals, those
who have inherited the sickle cell gene from both parents.33 Heterozygous individuals, those who have inherited one normal hemoglobin gene
and one sickle cell gene, test positive for the disease trait but effectively

have no adverse physical manifestations. 4 The sickle cell trait is concentrated in people of African ancestry and, to a lesser degree, those of
Middle Eastern or Mediterranean ancestry.35
Interest in screening for sickle cell anemia increased after the
deaths of four black Army recruits while training at moderately high

efforts to test applicants or employees for certain inherited characteristics that might render them
susceptible to workplace substances. See id. at 3. The target of genetic screening is the individual
and its purpose is, according to the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA"), to improve employee productivity, to lower workers' compensation costs through healthier employees, and to
improve employers' health care cost-containment efforts. See id. As a means to achieve these industrial goals, the OTA suggested that "[tihis could be done through exclusion (i.e., not hiring
those with deleterious genes because of the potential drain on health insurance)." Id. The OTA was
created by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972. See Technology Assessment Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-484, 86 Stat. 797 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 471-81 (1994). Its purpose is
to serve Congress by giving objective analyses of major policy issues related to technical and scientific change. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE
UNrED STATES GOVERNmENT MANuAL 61 (1995).
31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32. See Mark A. Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational
Illness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (1983).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Katherine Brokaw, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers' Liability, 23
COLUm. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 317, 323-24 (1990) (stating that one of the most significant problems
with workplace screening is that many genetic traits, like sickle cell, correspond to ethnicity).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss2/5

8

Seltzer: The Cassandra Complex: An Employer's Dilemma in the Genetic Workp
1998]

THE CASSANDRA COMPLEX

altitudes at Fort Bliss, Texas.36 With little scientific corroboration, the
Air Force Academy imposed an entrance ban on carriers of the sickle
cell gene, regardless of whether they showed evidence of the disease 7
In addition, the Department of Defense initiated a policy of excluding
sickle cell carriers from aviation and flight crew training. 8 Following
the Air Force's lead, Congress passed the National Sickle Cell Anemia
Control Act of 1972,"9 which appropriated federal funds for voluntary
testing programs to detect the sickle cell gene in the black population.'
The government, like the armed forces, ignored the critical difference
between the sickle cell trait carried by healthy heterozygous individuals
and the sickle cell disease,
thereby perpetuating the stigmatization of
4
over two million blacks 1
Industry soon reacted to the government's concern, suspecting that
healthy carriers of the sickle cell gene might prove more vulnerable, or
hyper-susceptible, to hemolytic agents such as amino and nitro compounds, benzene, cadmium, carbon monoxide, and cyanide. 2 In a three
month study of genetics in the workplace, the New York Times reported
that Du Pont de Nemours & Co. ("Du Pont") had routinely given preemployment blood tests to black applicants to identify carriers of the
sickle cell gene.43 Dr. Charles F. Reinhardt, Director of Du Pont's
Haskell Lab for Toxicology and Industrial Medicine, told the Times that
the tests were started in 1972 at the request of a group of black employees." Dr. Bruce W. Karrh, the Medical Director for Du Pont, maintained
that no job placement decisions had been made on the basis of the
tests.45
Subsequently, in the 1981 congressional hearings investigating the
existence of genetic screening in the workplace, Dr. Karrh testified that
the testing program had been publicly misconstrued. 46 He reaffirmed
that the screening of black employees and applicants was purely for
36. See Proctor, supra note 5, at 72.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136 (1972).
40. See Bowman, supra note 15, at 920.
41. See id.
42. See Brokaw, supra note 35, at 323.
43. See Richard Severo, Screening of Blacks by Du Pont Sharpens Debate on Gene Tests,
N.Y. TIms, Feb. 4, 1980, at Al.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Genetic Screening and the Handling of High-Risk Groups in the Workplace: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and
Tech., 97th Cong. 261 (1981) [hereinafter High-Risk Groups].
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their information and benefit and that no decisions had been made regarding placement or promotion as a result of the tests. 47 These reassuring statements contradicted prior admissions by Dr. Reinhardt in the
New York Times article that "the tests would definitely influence the
employment process."4' Both Dr. Karrh and Dr. Reinhardt were unable
to testify as to how many blacks applicant had been screened since the
program had been initiated in 1972 or how many instances of sickle cell
had been found.49 Both maintained that no systematized data had been
derived from the tests. 0 After numerous interviews with company officials, the New York Times concluded that "it remains difficult to determine precisely what is happening with genetic screening at Du Pont.""s
The Du Pont officials did seem to agree on one fact. Despite their
concern for the health of their employees, no thought had been given to
genetic testing of white workers of Mediterranean ancestry susceptible
to inheritable blood diseases.52 To explain this inconsistency, Dr. Karrh
stated in congressional hearings that the tests were limited to blacks because "the original request came from them.""3 However, he confirmed
that many of Du Pont's sites continued testing black applicants, and that
determination of who was black and would therefore be tested was done
"[b]y appearance."' Moreover, even though the tests were ostensibly
conducted for the employee's personal use, Dr. Karrh said that employee's medical records were retained in the company medical files,
accessible on a "need-to-know" basis.5 Also at the 1981 hearings, Dr.
Barton Childs, a professor at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, testified that he could see no reason for the Du Pont screening program, but
affirmed that this screening effectively stigmatized healthy individuals
them to discrimination in employment and in health insurand exposed
56
ance.
2. Enzyme Testing
In addition to screening black applicants for the sickle cell trait, Du
Pont tested applicants for two enzyme deficiencies prevalent in specific
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id.
Severo, supranote 43, at Al.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
High-Risk Groups,supra note 46, at 282.
Id.
See id. at 283-84.
See id.
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races and nationalities: Glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase ("G-6PD") deficiency and Serum alpha subscript 1-antitrypsin ("SAT') deficiency.57 G-6-PD deficiency is a biochemical genetic condition involving red blood cells, 5 which occurs homozygously in males and is found
primarily in blacks from Central Africa, Mediterraneans, Asians, East
Indians, Filipinos, and Oceanians.59 A deficiency of the enzyme interferes with the oxidation of glucose and was believed to endanger individuals exposed to industrial amino and nitro compoundsi0 However, no
information or studies exist to back up the proposition that deficient individuals exhibit a heightened medical risk from exposure to industrial
chemicals. 6
SAT deficiency, occurring most frequently among people of northern European ancestry, 62 is responsible for a predisposition to alveolar
destruction leading to chronic pulmonary disease. 3 Smoking and exposure to dusty environments exacerbate the condition.' As with the other
genetic conditions, there is a significant difference in outcome between
homozygous and heterozygous individuals, with only ten percent
of
6
SAT deficient heterozygotes ultimately developing the disease.
Dr. Karrh testified in the congressional hearings that Du Pont
tested for the two enzyme deficiencies on a limited basis to determine if
the tests would be of value in protecting the health of susceptible employees.66 He concluded that the tests were generally found not to be
useful in an occupational setting.6 7 In his testimony, Dr. Karrh stated
that he could not answer the question as to whether employees and applicants were notified prior to testing,6 and he affirmed that there were
no counseling or educational programs available for those workers
found to test positive for the deficiencies. 9
Dr. Karrh nevertheless admitted that the results of tests for G-6-PD
deficiency had been used to reassign four employees from positions that

57. See id. at 284.
58. See Rothstein, supra note 32, at 1386.
59. See id. at 1390.
60. See id. at 1385.
61. See id2 at 1386.
62. See id. at 1390-91.
63. See iU2at 1387.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See High-Risk Groups,supra note 46, at 266.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 284.
69. See id. at 285.
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had potential exposure to amino compounds. 0 He reassured the congressmen that upon discovery of this practice, the plant physician was
advised that tests should not be used as the sole criteria for placement
decisions.7 As with sickle cell testing, the results of the enzyme deficiency tests were filed with the medical records of the employee.72 Dr.
Karrh did not elaborate as to the planned use for these findings nor what
workplace decisions they would engender. Commenting on Du Pont's
screening policies, Dr. Jonathan King, molecular biologist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, maintained that:
"This policy of Du Pont's is very clearly a eugenic policy ....Du
Pont's position is scientific racism. They say they are not bigots because all this is based on science. But the fact is that people are not
going to get sick because they are hypersusceptible, they are going to
get sick because they are being poisoned." 74
The New York Times investigative study uncovered another company that had been testing thousands of workers to determine if
"defective" genes were making them more vulnerable to substances in
the workplace.75 Ironically, in this report, the employer, the Dow
Chemical Company ("Dow"), was equally censured, but in this case for
its failure to act on the basis of the test results. 76 Under the guidance of
Medical Director Jack Killian, Dow began conducting genetic monitoring on its workers to detect change in chromosomal structure due to exposure to workplace substances. 7 By the mid-1970s, Dr. Killian became
convinced that workers who exhibited consistently high rates of broken
chromosomes should be notified and transferred away from the chemicals that might be the cause of their chromosomal mutations. 78 According to Dr. Killian, when he and his colleagues determined that the chromosomal breakage centered on workers exposed to benzene and
epichiorohydrin, Dow officials grew distant, hostile, and defensive
about the findings.79 Dr. Killian eventually left Dow, along with the key

70. See id.
71. Seeid.
72. See id.at 283-84.
73. See id. at 283-87.
74. Severo, supra note 43, at Al.
75. See Richard Severo, Disputes Arise over Dow Studies on Genetic Damage in Workers,
N.Y. TrMEs, Feb. 5, 1980, at Al.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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people who contributed to the study.8
Dow, like Du Pont, maintained that after more than a decade and a
half of genetic screening involving thousands of workers, it had no exact
figure for how many workers were screened, what the tests concluded,
or how the company might use genetic monitoring in the future.8 Dow's

explanation for its failure to act on Dr. Killian's data was that his results
were difficult to evaluate and that it would be irresponsible to alarm
workers by citing findings that might prove to be inaccurate." The Dow
experiment, although initially established for outwardly beneficial reasons such as the protection of industrial workers, was eventually condemned because of the company's failure to act on the results of the
test.
The two corporations, Dow and Du Pont serve as early examples of
employers confronted with the Cassandra Complex. Lacking clear legal
and ethical guidance, they were both censured, one for acting and one
8
for failing to act on the results of predictive employee testing."
80. See id. Dr. Dante Picciano, the geneticist who worked under Dr. Killian, had a similar
problem in convincing Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") officials that the genetic results were
significant enough to necessitate corporate action. See id. He, like Dr. Killian, eventually left Dow.
See id.
81. See Richard Severo, Genetic Tests by Industry Raise Questions on Rights of Workers,
N.Y. TatEs, Feb. 3, 1980, at Al.
82. See id.
83. Not all exclusionary practices were based on medical testing. Some were enacted simply
on the basis of a worker's sex and misconceptions as to its limitations. These practices, like the
broad exclusions of healthy heterozygous individuals, were based on groundless generalizations of
a group's physical limitations. In January 1980, 13 female employees of the American Cyanamid
Company ("American"), along with their labor union, brought a sexual discrimination suit against
the company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See High-Risk Groups, supra note
46, at 172. The plaintiffs maintained that American fostered a policy barring all women except
those whose infertility was medically documented from certain jobs involving exposure to lead.
See id. Five of the women had undergone voluntary sterilization in order to keep their positions.
See id. A year prior to the suit, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") had
charged American with a violation of OSHA's regulatory standards and had fined the company
$10,000 for its sex-based exclusionary policies. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l. Union v.
American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 450 n,1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). OSHA settled the suit. See id.
OSHA's Lead Standard rejected the absolute exclusion of fertile women, requiring instead that
testing and transfers apply equally to men and women planning to parent children. See High-Risk
Groups, supra note 46, at 188-89. The issue of gender-biased policies was addressed by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of International Union v. Johnson Controls,Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991). The action was brought by women workers who had chosen to be sterilized to avoid losing
their jobs. See id. at 192. Johnson Controls' policy, like American's, excluded women from the
battery manufacturing process where the primary ingredient was lead. See id. at 206. In holding the
policy violative of women's rights under Title VII, the Court concluded that decisions regarding
the welfare of future children should be left to parents rather than to employers. See id. Addressing
the potential liability of the employer from suits by the offspring of exposed workers, the Court
explained: "If, under general tort principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies,
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C. CongressionalInterest in Genetic Monitoring and Screening
The newspaper reports exposing industrial experiments with genetic monitoring and screening finally reached the ears of Congress.
Alarmed by the rising controversy, Congress commissioned the Office
of Technology Assessment ("OTA") to conduct a survey on genetic
monitoring and screening in the workplace. The national survey targeted the 500 largest United States industries (Fortune 500), the fifty
largest utility companies, and thirty-three major unions." Much to the
government's surprise, the 1982 survey documented that six companies
were actually conducting genetic monitoring and screening, and that
fifty-five companies indicated they would "possibly" use genetic tests
within the next five year period.86 Albert Gore, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science
and Technology ("Subcommittee"), commented that "instead of putting
a controversy to rest, the OTA study gives further evidence of the need
to examine in much more detail the development of cytogenetic
screening as well as its ramifications. ' 'D
On the same day that the New York Times released the results of the
OTA's controversial survey,88 Representative Gore convened a hearing
before the Subcommittee to discuss the survey findings and their ethical
and legal implications for industry." After analyzing the results of the
survey, the Subcommittee heard various experts voice their concerns
over the developing trend of genetic screening and monitoring in the
workplace. Dr. Gretchen Kolsrud of the OTA testified in part that the
problems were arising due to the rapid development of genetic technologies."° She stated that "[w]e have no ethical guidelines to tell us how
or whether to use these capabilities because we have not had to face the
questions that are being posed by the potential of these new technolo-

the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the
basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best." Id. at 208.
84. See GENETIC MoNIroRING AND SCREENING, supranote 30, at 18.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 21-22; see also Genetic Screening of Workers: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Investigationsand Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Tech., 97th Cong. 2 (1982)
[hereinafter Genetic Screening of Workers] (finding that "a handful of companies are currently
using these methods and a more appreciable number intend to implement these practices in the
next 5 years").
87. GeneticScreening of Workers, supranote 86, at 2.
88. See Richard Severo, 59 Top U.S. Companies Plan Genetic Screening, N.Y. TZIS, June
23, 1982, at A12.
89. See Genetic Screening of Workers, supra note 86, at 1-2.
90. See id. at 44.
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gies ever before."9 Dr. Kenneth B. Miller, Medical Director for the
Workers' Institute for Safety and Health, stated that accepted guidelines
for medical screening stressed "the need for a demonstrated benefit to
the individual with little potential for harm."' He added that in order for
early intervention and treatment to be effective, there must be both "a
clear definition of what the disease state is and [knowledge of] the natural progression of the disease."93 Dr. Miller concluded that in the case of
genetic screening, where there is no known disease and no predictable
progression from chromosomal differences to disease, the potential
harm to the individual might outweigh the hypothetical benefit.9, Dr.
Miller predicted that, by labeling individuals as "hyper-susceptible,"
employers could shift the responsibility for workplace safety to the genetics of the worker. This shift would deflect "the attention that might
be paid to the employer's inability or unwillingness to make the workplace safe for all those who trust that their health will be protected on
the job."" Mark Rothstein, Professor at the College of Law, West Virginia University and an expert on the ethical ramifications of genetic
screening, also testified before the subcommittee.96 He anticipated that
with the advent of genetic screening, the potential workforce would become divided into two groups. He explained that "[o]ne group would
contain super healthy, disease-resistant persons; a second group would
contain able-bodied persons who are unemployable because of an atypical hereditary trait or a chromosomal anomaly that places them in a
category of statistically higher risk of occupational illness."' Representative Gore observed that genetic surveillance was "akin to a black art
and that it is really very tentative and premature. Nevertheless, companies are rushing headlong into this technique, or apparently many of
them are ready to move quickly into this area."93
In 1989, the OTA conducted a second survey, designed to remove
ambiguities that might have been present in the initial survey and to
provide trend data for the seven years that elapsed since the 1982 survey. 9 Of the 330 Fortune companies responding to the 1989 survey,
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at45.
Id. at 50.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 51.
See id. at 97.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 44.
99. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MEDICAL MONITORING AND
SCREENING IN THE VORKPLACE: RESULTS OF A SURVEY-BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (1991)
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twelve health officers reported that their companies were currently conducting genetic monitoring or screening, as compared with six reporting
such use in 19 82 .'00 Substantiating the New York Times reports, the survey found that twenty-seven percent of health officers in the 1989 survey reported "the existence of medical criteria that affected employment
eligibility of job applicants. These included back ailments or problems,
pregnancy, sensitivity to materials used in production, and respiratory
conditions.'' °. Ultimately, with an almost audible sigh of relief, the OTA
concluded that the 1989 survey appeared to indicate that there was no
evidence of a sizeable increase in the number of companies using genetic screening or monitoring, and that fewer companies appeared to
anticipate using it in the future."°r
In the same year that the second survey was conducted, the United
States government publicly launched the Human Genome Project, the
largest, most ambitious experiment in human genetics to have ever been
conducted.
III.

THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT

A.

Origins

As ethical debates raged on Capitol Hill, the seed for the ambitious
Human Genome Project was planted in the arid soil of Santa Cruz, New
Mexico. In May 1985, Robert Sinsheimer, who was then the chancellor
[hereinafter MEDICAL MONrroRING].
100. See id. In the 1989 survey, 20 health officers stated that their companies had conducted
genetic screening or monitoring either currently or in the past, whereas 18 officers reported such
current or past use in the 1982 survey. See id.
101. Id. at 4. Of particular concern in the 1989 study was the question of what preemployment examinations would be considered acceptable. See id. at 4-7. Most health and personnel officers responded affirmatively to the use of examinations to identify employees who were:
physically unfit for employment; currently using drugs; at increased risk to workplace hazards or
emotionally or psychologically unstable. See id. The use of testing to identify high insurance risks
was found to be acceptable by a smaller proportion of health and personnel officers. See id. Almost
universally, corporate personnel officers thought periodic medical testing of employees in workplace settings where there were known health risks was appropriate. See id. In voicing their concerns for future genetic testing in the workplace, the respondents reported cost-effectiveness, reliability, and legality as primary considerations. See id. Over half of the health officers responding
to the survey agreed with the idea that genetic testing represented a potential threat to the rights of
the employee. See id. Interestingly, those companies reporting current genetic testing were most
likely to agree with this idea. See id. The growing concern of employers over the rising cost of
health insurance featured prominently in their responses. See id. More than a third of the respondents answered that an applicant's health insurance risk was assessed when considering his or her
candidacy for a position with the company.
102. See GENETICMONrrORING AND SCREENING, supra note 30, at 21-22.
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of the University of California at Santa Cruz, gathered an assorted mix
of deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") experts to discuss the feasibility of
mapping and sequencing the entire human genome" In the same year,
Charles DeLisi, who had proposed an independent Human Genome Initiative to the Department of Energy ("DOE"), became the Director of
the DOE's Office of Health and Environmental Research. 4 After a
1986 meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, DeLisi proposed that certain
national laboratories should become the center of the United States', and
perhaps the world's, human genome efforts."0 " Funding for DeLisi's
proposals began in fiscal year 1987, commanding an initial budget of
$4.2 million."6
In addition to the DOE, several other governmental agencies and
private institutions had launched corresponding programs with ambitious goals and sizeable budgets. The National Institutes of Health
("NIH") held a meeting in October 1986 to set policy for the NIH's
3000 projects (with a combined budget of $294 million) involving genetic mapping and sequencing.' The National Science Foundation, the
103. See James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project:Past, Present,and Future,Sci., Apr.
6, 1990, at 44, 45. The human genome consists of approximately 50,000 to 100,000 genes found
on 23 pairs of chromosomes, with one set inherited from each parent. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERvs. & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, UNDERSTANDING OUR GENETIC INHERrTANCE: THE
HUMAN GENOmE PROjECr: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS FY 1991-1995, at 9 (1990) [hereinafter THE
FIRST FIVE YEARS]. Each chromosome contains a long molecule of DNA, whose two ribbon-like
strands vrap around each other, forming a twisted ladder. The rungs of the ladder contain a linear
array of bases called A, T, G, and C. The order of the four bases on the DNA strand determines the
information content of a particular gene. See id.; see also Denise K. Casey, What Can the New
Gene Tests Tell Us?, JUDGES' J., Summer 1997, at 14, 15 (stating the order of "As, Ts, Cs, and
Gs-is different for everyone, which is what makes each of us unique"). For all our differences,
human beings are about 99.9 percent identical in their genetic blueprints, with the remaining one
tenth of one percent accounting for all our physical and mental variations. See id. at 16. All DNA
sequence changes, called mutations, are either inherited from our parents or acquired during our
lifetime and are responsible for human disease and abnormalities. See id.
104. See ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE VARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN
GENOME 79-80 (1994). By proposing his initiative to the Department of Energy ("DOE"), DeLisi
brought the Human Genome Project to the public policy agenda. See id.
105. See Watson, supranote 103, at 45. The origins of the project are credited to several other
independent events, including a meeting of prominent geneticists in Alta, Utah in 1984 and an influential article written by Nobel Laureate Renatto Dulbecco, which was published in Science in
1986, urging that the human genome be sequenced. See Charles R. Cantor, Orchestratingthe Human Genome Project,ScI., Apr. 6, 1990, at 49, 49. All of the roots came together for the first time
at a meeting in Cold Spring Harbor, New York in 1986, where the current model of the project
reached full idealization. See id.
106. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSmENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAPPING OUR GENEs-GENOME
PROJECTS: How BIG, How FAST? 100 (1988) [hereinafter How BIG, HOW FAST?]. The funds were
for 10 different projects being conducted at Columbia and Harvard Universities and three national
laboratories. See id.
107. See id. at 93-94. The National Institutes of Health ("NIH") is a branch of the Department
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Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and the National Research Council

("NRC") also committed substantial funding to research related to
mapping and sequencing the human genome'0
In light of these potentially conflicting projects, the Board of Basic
Biology, Commission on Life Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences held a meeting in August 1986 and decided to commission a special NRC committee to prepare a report as to how the United States
should proceed with the Human Genome Project."" The committee's report urged the United States government to begin a unified Human
Genome Project and to cooperate with other interested nations."' The
committee proposed a fifteen-year project, with an estimated budget of
$200 million per year."' At the same time, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce commissioned the OTA to prepare a report assessing the scientific and medical validity of the genome projects."' The

OTA's final report, published in April 1988, sounded a cautionary note
regarding the possible ethical and legal implications of the genome
projects." 3 The OTA concluded that the question of whether the United
States should enter the genetic arena was moot, since mapping and sequencing activities had been ongoing for a decade with no governmental
prohibition." 4 The report recommended that the federal government become involved in genome research in the public interest of "making resources available in ways that are consistent with the considerations of

of Health and Human Services committed to biomedical research to improve human health. See id.
at 93. Its projects involving genetic mapping and sequencing commanded a combined budget of
$294 million. See id.
108. See id. at 102-07. The National Science Foundation, commissioned to continue the federal government's role in sponsoring basic research, had spent, in 1987, an estimated $32.7 million
in research related to genetic sequencing and mapping. See id. In 1987, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, a privately endowed organization, had committed an estimated $40 million to genetic
research, and the National Research Council, a federal agency providing the government with advice regarding scientific issues, had recommended $200 million per year for a three year research
project on the genome. See id.
109. See Watson, supra note 103, at 45.
110. See id. For additional information on international genome initiatives, see generally
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONONIY

(1991)

(describing the increasing international attention focused on the commercial and scientific development of new biotechnology); No~lle Lenoir, French, European, and InternationalLegislation
on Bioethics, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1249 (1993); Dorothy C. Wertz, InternationalPerspectives
on Ethics and Human Genetics, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1411 (1993); Charles F. DeJager, Note,
The Development ofRegulatory Standardsfor Gene Therapy in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM
INT'LLJ. 1303 (1995).
111. See Watson, supra note 103, at 45.
112. See id.
113. See How BIG,HOWFAST?, supranote 106, at 79.
114. Seeid. at80-81.
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beneficence, justice, and autonomy.""' The OTA stressed that the government's involvement was needed to ensure centralized control of the
evolving technological applications of the genome project so that ethical
issues, such as voluntary testing and the access of data, could be addressed, regulated, and controlled by federal legislation." 6 In considering the ethical implications of the genome initiative, the report warned
that "[t]hese questions are complex and are not likely to be resolved in
the near future. It will therefore be necessary to ensure that some means
for explicitly addressing ethical issues attends scientific work.""' 7 The
report concluded with the recommendation that the mapping and sequencing efforts continue to evolve as a multi-agency effort, but that
Congress regulate
the level of involvement and control accorded to the
8
participants.
Congress assessed the need for centralized governmental involvement in the genome initiatives as early as January 1987."' The Biotechnology Competitiveness Act of 1987' 20 addressed the need for a federal
policy coordinating biotechnical efforts, particularly encouraging the
cooperation and communication between the research community, government, and industry. 12' Responding to perceived ethical and safety
concerns, the proponents of the bill recommended the establishment of a
Biomedical Ethics Board, an independent entity in the executive branch
which would include representatives from all of the federal agencies
funding biotechnology-related regulation, research, or promotion.' " The
bill additionally proposed the establishment of the National Advisory
Panel on the Human Genome, co-chaired by the NIH and DOE officials
to recommend the best strategy for the genome project, including the
evaluation of ethical considerations raised by genetic research and prod115. Id. at 87.
116. See id
117. Id at 88.
118. Seeid.atllO.
119. On January 7, 1987, Senator Claude Pepper introduced The National Center of Biotechnology Information Act, S. 1354, that would give the NIH's National Library of Medicine responsibility for developing new biotechnical communication tools and for serving as repository and
center of distribution for molecular biology information. See 133 CoNG. REc. H350 (daily ed. Jan.
21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Pepper). The bill was amended and introduced jointly by Senators
Chiles, Kennedy, Domenici, Leahy, Graham, and Wilson on December 18, 1987 as the Biotechnology Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1966. See 133 CONG. REc. S18,399-400 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 1987).
120. "A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to improve information and research on
biotechnology and the human genome, and for other purposes .
133 CoNG. REc. S18,399
(daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987).
121. See id. at S18,399 (statement of Sen. Chiles).
122. Seeid. atS18,400.
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uct development.' To ensure the bill's passage, its proponents raised
the specter of the potential for destructive or unethical uses of the new

genetic information if governmental controls were not imposed, as well
as the overriding need to "keep the U.S. biotechnology industry the best
in the world."'4
In fiscal year 1988, the DOE was awarded $12 million of its $15

million budget request to continue its genome effort. An additional $18
million was subsequently awarded to the National Institutes of General
Medical Sciences ("NIGMS"), the NIH's genome research division."
With these appropriations, Congress sent a clear message that both the
DOE and the NIH would be responsible for the development of a united
Human Genome Project.16
B. ProjectPlanningand Organization

Faced with the reality of having to cooperate in order to obtain
continued federal funding for their genome initiatives, the DOE and the

NIH signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1988 and appointed a
joint advisory group to outline the strategy of the unified Human
Genome Project. In April of 1990, the joint advisory group of the NIH's
National Center for Human Genome Research ("NCHGR") and DOE's
Office of Health and Environmental Research ("OBER") published a
comprehensive plan outlining the mission and organization of the first
five years of the Human Genome Project.'27

123. See idl
124. Id. at S18,405. To underscore this latter goal, the proponents introduced articles reporting advances in biotechnology by the Japanese, which threatened to topple the United States as the
leading biotechnological giant. See id. at S18,402-03. Expounding on Japan's commitment of
funds to biotechnology, the article warned of Japan's capacity for dominating biotechnology in the
same manner that it had previously dominated the electronic and automotive fields. See id.
125. See Watson, supra note 103, at 45-46.
126. Inhearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources in July 1996,
Senator Domenici reflected on the origins of the collaboration between the NIH and the DOE in
the Human Genome Project. He stated:
I can remember vividly 10 years ago that we got this [Genome Project] started by creating, believe it or not, a competition between the Department of Energy and the NIH.
The NIH was kind of worried about whether they should do [the Project], and I said,
well, fine, if they will not: let us have the Department of Energy do it, since they had
been doing a lot of genetic work because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And, believe it or
not, the enthusiasm of the NIH changed in a positive and exponential manner once I introduced the bill to give the Genome Project to the Department of Energy.
Advances in Genetics Research and Technologies: Challengesfor Public Policy, 104th Cong. 2
(1996) [hereinafterAdvances in Genetics Research].
127. See THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 103. Although the two agencies found themselves united in the new partnership, their individual interests in the Human Genome Project were
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The 1990 joint NIH and DOE plan articulated the overall goal of
the Human Genome Project: "to acquire fundamental information
needed to further our basic scientific understanding of human genetics
and of the role of various genes in health and disease. ' ' Two of the
specific goals for the period from 1990 to 1995 were: (1) the production

of a variety of physical maps of all human chromosomes and of those of
selected model organisms and (2) the determination of the completed
sequence of human DNA and the DNA of the model organisms. 9 The
program was expected to take fifteen years to complete, with an estimated expenditure of $3 billion.'" To address ethical and legal issues,
the agencies proposed a NIH and DOE joint working group on Ethical,
Legal, and Social Implications ("ELSI") to anticipate and address the
implications for individuals and society of mapping and sequencing the
human genome."' The ELSI group's initial emphasis was on the
"privacy of genetic information, safe and effective introduction of genetic information in the clinical setting, fairness in the use of genetic inquite different. See How BIG, How FAST?, supra note 106, at 99. Dating back to the Manhattan
Project of World War II, the Office of Health and Environmental Research ("OHER") began as a
health division focusing on protecting people from the effects of radiation and on developing uses
for radioactive materials in medicine and biomedical research. See id. The primary mission of the
OHER continued to be the study of the sources of radiation, pollution, and environmental toxins
and to determine their effects on the environment. See id. In its initial research efforts through its
three national laboratories, the DOE planned to use the results of the Human Genome Project to
monitor the inherited effects of low level exposure to radiation and other environmental hazards.
See THE FIRST FIvE YEARS, supra note 103, at 31. The NIH's long history of support for genetic
research was an extension of its mission to improve the health of Americans. See Cantor, supra
note 105, at 50. In its involvement in the Human Genome Project, the NIH focused on refinements
in human genome mapping and sequencing to combat human diseases. See id. The union of the
relative strengths of the two agencies, NIH's expertise in medical application and DOE's expertise
in environmental technology, was considered the perfect marriage for the birth of the Human
Genome Project. See THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 103, at 32-33.
128. THEFIRST FIVEYEARS, supra note 103, at 5.
129. See id.Genetic "[m]apping is the process of determining the position and spacing of
genes, or other genetic landmarks, on the chromosomes relative to one another." THE FIRST FIvE
YEARS, supra note 103, at 9. Physical maps give precise distances in terms of DNA base pairs and
give access to the DNA itself in pieces that can be readily handled in the laboratory. See James D.
Watson, Genes and the Legacy of PsychiatricIllness, DECADE OF THE BRAIN, Spring 1991, at 3.
Genetic sequencing, the more ambitious of the two goals, involves the identification of all three
billion DNA base pairs in a linear pattern. See Alistair T. Iles, The Human Genome Project: A
Challenge to the Human Rights Framework, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27, 29-30 (1996). By comparing the DNA of healthy and diseased people, sequencing provides the best hope for understanding
the molecular alterations responsible for disease. See Watson, supra note 103, at 44. Because of
the high costs involved in the sequencing technologies, it was projected that the sequencing of the
entire human genome would take in excess of fifteen years. See THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note
103, at 6.
130. See THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supranote 103, at 6-7.
131. Seeid. at66.
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formation, and professional and public education." ' Three percent of
the overall Human Genome
project budget was made available for the
133
activities of the ELSI.
C. ProjectProgress

By fiscal year 1990, the Human Genome Project had grown from a

4
$17.2 million program to one commanding a budget of $59.5 million."
With the increase in funding came increased concern with the application of the discoveries rapidly being made by the initiative. In hearings
before the House of Representatives on March 19, 1991, Representative
Michael Andrews of Texas (D-TX), quoting George Bernard Shaw,
stated that "'[s]cience is always wrong. It never solves a problem without creating 10 more. ' "1 35 He expressed a concern that with easy access
to a person's genetic profile, there would be a heightened potential for
unfair denial of benefits and jobs. 36 He urged Congress to enact laws
that would prevent discrimination based on genetic profiles while
maintaining that "[tlhe promise of the human genome
project should be
37
enough to move us forward as fast as possible."'
The progress of the Human Genome Project continued in relative38
obscurity through the next six years, with modest increases in funding.'

132. Francis Collins & David Galas, A New Five-Year Planfor the U.S. Human Genome
Project, Sc., Oct. 1, 1993, at 43, 45.
133. See THEFIRSTFIVE YEARS, supra note 103, at 20.
134. SeeS. REP. No. 101-516, at 146 (1990).
135. 137 CONG. REc. E992 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1991) (quoting George Bernard Shaw).
136. See id.
137. Id. The CongressionalRecord for April 22, 1991 includes remarks by Dr. Francis Collins, the Director of NIH's National Human Genome Research Institute ("NHGRI'), announcing
the project's success in identifying and cloning the gene for cystic fibrosis. See 137 CONG, REC.
E1354-56 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1991). Dr. Collins, speaking before the Congressional Biomedical
Research Caucus, urged continued support for the program and assured the Representatives that
concerns with the ethical and legal dilemmas created by the findings of the project were being addressed. See id.
138. According to the Budget of the United States, the following estimated funding levels
were authorized for the National Center for Human Genome Research: 1991 - $108 million; 1992 $110.5 million; 1993 - $ 110.4 million; 1994 - $134.5 million; 1995 - $152 million; and 1996 $166.7 million. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996 app. at 475 (1995); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1995 app. at 437 (1994); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1994
app. at 612 (1993); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993 app. at 503 (1992); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 649 (1991); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1991
app. at 709-10 (1990).
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The Human Genome Project was given a sizeable boost on May 21,
1997, when the Senate passed the Mack-Feinstein Amendment, doubling the investment in biomedical research at the NIH by 2002 and renewing Congress' interest in the project. 9 In his congressional testimony on September 30, 1997, Dr. Collins stated that although only two
percent of the human genome had been sequenced, projects initiated in
1996 would generate between 50 and 100 million base pairs of human
DNA sequence by 1998, leading to a total sequence of the genome by
2005.' 40 Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the NIH's National Human
Genome Research Institute ("NHGRI"), further testified that as a result
of the Human Genome Project, new disease genes were discovered almost weekly, with recent identification of the sequences of genes involved in the onset of colon cancer, diabetes, breast cancer, and Alzheimer's disease.'4' He added that ELSI's major focus i1 1997 was to
ensure the responsible use of genetic information, since the rapid increase in the number of genetic tests available to the individual greatly
increases the potential for misinterpretation and abuse. 42
The achievements of the Human Genome Project, in conjunction
with international genome initiatives and with private biotechnology
corporations, continue on a daily basis.' 4 The discoveries made by the
initiatives have contributed to the identification of the genes associated
with diseases such as Huntington's disease, neurofibromatosis types 1 &
2, certain genetic types of breast and colon cancers, hypertension, diabetes, and Alzheimer's disease."4 Progress in identifying genetic markers
affecting predisposition to common ailments such as lower back injuries, allergies, and arthritis have been equally successful. 45 Based on
these findings, dozens of new biotechnology companies have sought to
develop genetic tests for disorders ranging from arthritis to obesity.'
On September 14, 1997, biologists at the NHGRI isolated the first gene
that may affect social behavior in mammals, a discovery which prom-

139. See 143 CONG. REc. S4867 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
140. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 143d Cong. 11 (1997) (statement of Francis S. Collins, Director of NHGRI).
141. See id.

142. See id.
143. See Postscript infra notes 361-81 and accompanying text.
144. See Collins & Galas, supranote 132, at 46.
145. See Francis S. Collins et al., Variations on a Theme: CatalogingHuman DNA Sequence
Variations, 278 Sci. 1580, 1580 (1997); David Shenk, Biocapitalism: What Price the Genetic
Revolution?, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Dec. 1997, at 37, 38.
146. See Casey, supra note 103, at 14.
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ises to shed new light on disorders of human social behavior such as
schizophrenia and autism.' 47
D. Progressin Ethical Considerations
From the discovery of the recombinant DNA technique in November 1974, which launched the age of genetic engineering to the scientific
planning conferences in the 1980s, there seems to be little documentary
evidence indicating that the scientists who proposed the Human
Genome Project considered its ethical and legal implications. 48 The reluctance by the scientific community to evaluate ethical problems

squarely shifted to Congress the contradictory tasks of anticipating the
societal repercussions caused by the access to genetic information and
of continuing to champion expanding genetic projects.
Governmental concern for the ethical dilemmas associated with the
Human Genome Project were voiced several years prior its launching.'49
On January 26, 1987, the OTA sponsored a workshop entitled Issues of

Collaboration for Human Genome Projects'50 which convened in preparation for the OTA's final assessment report recommending federal
control over the project. One of the speakers, Dr. Mark Lapp6 of the
University of Illinois at Chicago College of Medicine, warned of the
long-term ethical implications of mapping and sequencing the human
genome.'5 He urged that scientific professionals take immediate steps to
insure that the results of the project be used for the benefit of society
and to safeguard against the misuse of sensitive genetic data. 2 In re147. See Nicholas Wade, Gene Foundin Mice Could Affect Study of Human Behavior Disorders, ARIZONA REPUBIc, Sept. 14, 1997, at A20.
148. See Charles Weiner, Anticipating the Consequences of Genetic Engineering: Past,Present, andFuture, in ARE GENES Us? 31, 31 (Carl F. Cranor ed., 1994). Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director
of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Bioethics, suggested that this scientific reluctance to
address ethical issues stems from an awareness by researchers that ethical concerns may stand in
the way of continued funding for biotechnical projects. See Shenk, supranote 145, at 39-42.
149. One of the earliest expression of concern came from Senator Edward Kennedy in his
address at the Harvard Medical School in May 1975:
"When science develops techniques that have the potential to fundamentally change
society, society has the right to determine how the technique is to be used, whether it
should be developed in the first place, and if so, under what constraints. A decision to
pursue the kind of research discussed... requires the informed consent of the societywhich, after all-is called upon to fund it."
Weiner, supra note 148, at 43.
150. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAPPING OUR GENES: FEDERAL
GENOMiE PROJECTS: How VAST? How FAST? (1987) [hereinafter MAPPING OUR GENES]
(Transcript of Workshop: "Issues of Collaboration for Human Genome Projects").
151. See id at 6.
152. See id at 21.
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viewing the eugenic experiments of the past, Dr. Lapp6 warned that,
armed with the results from the Human Genome Project, eugenicists
would, for the first time, be able to point to "hard" genetic data to attain
their desired ends." 3 He concluded that "[b]ecause of the intrinsic capacity of genomic information to be used to discriminate (both invidiously and acceptably) among members of the population and to affect
their entitlements, it is also highly desirable that protections' 4 against
significant abuse be in place before the project gets underway."'
The joint report from the NIH and the DOE, which outlined the
first five years of the Human Genome Project, gave considerable attention to the report of the working group, ELSI, and to the ethical, social,
and legal issues awaiting the dawn of the genetic era. 5 The report
stressed the need to protect individuals and society from the possible
hazards resulting from the new methods for detecting and predicting hereditary illness.'56 The report underscored that "[t]he use of genetic information, for good or ill, has long been an issue in our society. But the
quantity and complexity of genetic information that should become
available requires that special precautions be taken."'57 In analyzing the
potential discriminatory effects caused by the release of genetic information to employers and insurers, the report concluded that "[t]he interim phase, before adequate treatment is available, is the one in which
the most deleterious consequences can occur, such as discrimination
against gene carriers, loss of employment or insurance, stigmatization,
untoward psychological reactions and attention."'' After outlining a
plan for addressing these ethical dilemmas,'59 the ELSI working group
concluded that a critical ethical component for the first five years was
informing the general public of the goals of the Human Genome Project
and soliciting from them their questions and concerns."

153. See id. at 44.
154. AL at 60 (emphasis added). For a more thorough discussion of the ethical challenges
generated by the Human Genome Project, see JUSnCE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECr, supra
note 10.
155. See THEFIRSTFIVEYEARS, supra note 103, at 65-71.
156. See id. at 65.
157. Id
158. l
159. See id. at 66-69.
160. See id. at 70. The relative anonymity of the Human Genome Project was commented on
by the Director of NHGRI, who stated:
"If you ask the average person what the Human Genome Project is and what it will do,
most people will say, Huh? But when the history of science is written 100 years from
now, this will be seen as the greatest scientific project of the century, maybe of all
time."
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Seven years after its initial report, ELSI produced a final report in
September 1997.161 Although the report's findings centered on the accuracy and confidentiality of genetic test results in laboratories and medical offices, the report echoed the themes of its 1990 plan. Strongly advocating informed consent wherever genetic specimens could be traced
back to the subject, the ELSI working group stressed that "[u]nder no
circumstances should results with identifiers be provided to any outside
parties, including employers, insurers, or government agencies... [nor
should any person] be subjected to unfair discrimination by a third party
on the basis of having had a genetic test or receiving an abnormal genetic test result."'6' In conceding that its prior mandate for universal
education was more difficult that initially anticipated, the task force
stated that "identifying a genetic variant that has a much higher frequency in some ethnic groups than in others could have a stigmatizing
effect on that group."' 63 In April 1990, James D. Watson, co-discoverer
of the structure of DNA and Director of the NCHGR in the infancy of
the Human Genome Project, warned:
We must work to ensure that society learns to use the information only
in beneficial ways and, if necessary, pass laws at both the federal and
state levels to prevent invasions of privacy of an individual's genetic
background by either employers, insurers, or government agencies and
to prevent discrimination on genetic grounds.... We have only to look
at how the Nazis used leading members of the German human genetics
and psychiatry communities to justify their genocide programs ....
We need no more vivid reminders that science in the wrong hands can
do incalculable hann. 164

Mark Schoofs, How Genetics is Changing our Lives, VILLAGE VOICE (New York, N.Y.), Sept. 30,
1997, at 18.
161. See PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: FINAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING (Neil A. Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds.,
1997) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
162. Id. at xiv.
163. Id. at 65; Charles W. Henderson, Breast Cancer Gene May Intensify Breast Cancer
Growth, CANCER WKLY PLus, Sept. 7, 1997. As progress in gene sequencing continues, scientists
have continued to find genetic alterations that are prevalent in specific nationalities or races. See
Rick Weiss, Jews Say Gene Find Medically, Culturally Troubling, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 8, 1997,
at 2E (documenting that these discoveries have further fueled fears of stigmatization based on genetic stereotype). The Johns Hopkins Medical Center recently discovered a tiny genetic variation
found in one of every six Jews of Eastern European ancestry that doubles the odds of getting colon
cancer. See id. This genetic discovery joins other diseases found in similarly isolated and genetically "intact" populations such as musculoskeletal disease (Amish), diabetes (Native American),
sickle cell anemia (Blacks), and cystic fibrosis (Northern Europeans), See id.
164. Watson, supra note 103, at 46.
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IV.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND INACTION

To date, there has been no federal legislation enacted to guide employers or insurers in the ethical and legal use of genetic information.
By the year 2005, the scheduled completion date of the Project, such information should be as readily accessible as the results of a routine
blood test. As evidenced by the vast differences in interpretation between courts on issues related to workplace discrimination, it is clear
that the establishment of uniform laws to regulate the collection, use,
and retention of genetic information must come from the legislature.
Without these statutes, the courts will be left to generate decisions in a
highly technical area with minimal information or advice.'65 Additionally, the successful resolution of the myriad of ethical and legal issues
generated by the Human Genome Project will require compromise and
deliberation, two qualities better embodied by the legislative rather than
the judicial process.' 66 Congress, unlike the courts, has the power to
delegate to an agency the authority to establish criteria and procedures
to guide the employer through the evolving legal labyrinth of genetic
information in the workplace. 67
In 1995, the ELSI component of the Human Genome Project issued
a proposed model for federal legislation entitled The Genetic Privacy
Act and Commentary. 6 1 The main goal of the model act was to provide
assurance that an individual's genetic information would not be controlled or possessed by third parties unless consented to by the individual.169 The act proposes an express prohibition on the unauthorized collection and analysis of DNA information where the individual's identity
can be determined.'70 However, the act does allow DNA collection for a
number of specific purposes, including issues involving research activities, fetuses and pregnant women, and minors and incompetent people.'7 '
165. Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications, in conjunction with the Einstein Institute, initiated the Genetics Adjudication Research Project whose goal was to educate 1000 state and federal
judges on genetics and molecular biology over a two year period. See Genetic Testing: Courts,
LegislaturesReady for Flood of Genetics Related Cases and Bills, 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) (Dec.
12, 1996), availablein Westlaw, 5 B.H.L.R. 48. Franklin M. Zweig, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Einstein Institute, commented that the courts are going to have "one hell of a time"
ruling on complaints involving genetic discrimination without a scientific background. See id.
166. See Jack F. Williams, A Regulatory Modelfor Genetic Testing in Employment, 40 OKLA.
L. REV. 181, 201 (1987).

167. See id. at 203.
168. See Burk Burnett, Note, Genetic Discrimination:Legislation Required to Keep Genetic
Secrets, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 502, 520-21 (1997).

169. See id. at 521.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 522.
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Although the act proposes lucrative liquidated damages and treble damages for unlawful use of genetic information, it does not address criminal penalties. 72 The drafters of the model act maintained that any future
legislation must balance the individual's need for privacy and autonomy
against science's need to continue proper and useful genetic research.'
In stressing the need for Congress to adopt the ELSI recommendations,
Dr. Francis Collins concluded that "[g]enetic discrimination has been
hailed as the 'civil rights' issue of this decade. We have the unique opportunity to address genetic privacy and discrimination issues now as
the scientific information unfolds, before we find ourselves in a fullfledged crisis."' 74
A. State Response
To keep pace with the swift advancements in biotechnology, state
legislatures saw an explosion of bills addressing genetic privacy in the
insurance and employment contexts.' 5 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, at least twenty-six states had passed legislation prohibiting the discriminatory use of genetic information by in-

surance companies by 1997.176
The principal struggle in enacting statutes governing genetic information is the attempt to strike a balance between the rights of the individual to genetic privacy and ownership of his germline, and the needs
of science to have unlimited access to the results of genetic tests and experiments. The laborious process of New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act'"
through the legislature and the governor's office gives a telling indication of the competing interests at play throughout the enactment process
of genetic regulation.
The struggle in New Jersey stemmed from one deceptively simple
provision of the Act: the classification of genetic information as the

172. See id.
173. See id. at 522-23.
174. Advances in Genetics Research, supra note 126, at 49.
175. See Burnett, supranote 168, at 509.
176. See Robert Pear, Concerned States Pass Legislation Regulating Genetic Testing Results,
RocKY MTN. NEws, Nov. 2, 1997, at 18A. Carl Feldbaum, president of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, representing 730 companies, expressed alarm at the rapid growth of legislative
initiatives governing genetic research: "'The sponsors of these bills are well intentioned[,] [blut
often they don't understand the science or the potential consequences of their bills. Some of the
legislation would virtually stop genetic research or severely limit our ability to conduct clinical
trials."' Id
177. Genetic Privacy Act, S.B. 695, 207th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1996) (amending NJ. Stat.
Ann. § 17B:30-12 (Supp. 1996)).
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property right of its owner.' 78 This seemingly innocent provision raised
the powerful hackles of New Jersey's booming insurance and genetic
research industries. Dr. Philip Reilly, a clinical geneticist and director of
the Shriver Center for Mental Retardation in Waltham, Massachusetts,
after analyzing the bill, declared that the property right provision
"'could dramatically change the discipline of pathology and could impose major costs on research. '"1 79 George Annas, Professor of Health
Law at Boston University School of Public Health, countered that
"people should own their genetic information, their 'probabilistic future
diary"' and that "[t]he argument that such property rights will drive research jobs out of New Jersey is 'just a scare tactic."" 8 On November
19, 1996, Governor Christie Whitman signed the Genetic Privacy Act
into law, following the deletion of the offending provision on genetic
property rights.'
Despite this deletion, the New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act met a
number of the requirements that ELSI had previously recommended for
the "model" Genetic Privacy Act, as have a number of other state statutes. Some states have been less reticent than New Jersey and have declared that genetic information is the property right of the individual to
whom it pertains."' In general, however, most states have opted to follow New Jersey in stopping short of providing property rights for genetic information. They have, instead, made statements of varying
forcefulness prohibiting the use of genetic information in employment,
or, at least banning employment discrimination on the basis of genetic
test results. Iowa, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, Texas, and Wisconsin have enacted statutes that ban genetic
testing and genetic discrimination in the workplace,"3 and, in some
178. See Robert Schwaneberg, Ethical Debate Focuses on Use of Genetic Data, SUNDAY
STAR-LEDGER (New Jersey), Aug. 25, 1996, at 21.

179. Il
180. Il
181. See Statelines New Jersey: Governor Signs Genetic Privacy Act, AmiERICAN HEALTHNov. 20, 1996, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS database. Governor Whitman said that
"[t]his legislation strikes an important balance between protecting privacy and preventing discrimination, while ensuring that scientific and medical research are not unduly inhibited or burdened." Id.
182. See OR. REV. STAT. § 659.715 (1997). Under this statute, however, if the genetic sample
or information is to be used for anonymous research, that information is not property of the individual. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 1997) (requiring informed consent
of the person to be subjected to DNA testing and analysis).
183. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6(2)(a) (West 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3(I)(a)
(Supp. 1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1997-98); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-28.1 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (1995); TEx. REv. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 9031, § 3
(West Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.372(1)(a) (West 1997).
LINE,
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cases, ban the sale and interpretation of genetic information to the employer by a third party."N New Hampshire and Wisconsin expanded the
ban on the use of genetic information by prohibiting even voluntary
agreements offering employment or benefits in exchange for submission
to testing.
Unfortunately, with the exception of Rhode Island, most of the
states that have enacted genetic privacy legislation have provided for a
variety of exceptions which allow the use of genetic information in the
workplace and which, effectively, undercut the prohibitions in the statutes. Iowa's and Wisconsin's statutes allow genetic testing with the
employee's written and informed consent for the limited purposes of investigating workers' compensation claims and determining an employee's susceptibility to a workplace toxin.'86 The overall strength of
New Hampshire's ban on forced genetic testing is significantly weakened by the concession that an employer is not prohibited from genetic
testing to determine "whether an individual meets reasonable functional
standards for a specific job or task."'8 7 Oregon authorizes the genetic
testing of an individual if informed consent is granted and if the test is
solely to determine a bona fide occupational qualification.' Likewise,
New York's Civil Rights Law states that an employee can be denied
employment on the basis of a "unique genetic disorder" if it can be
"clearly shown" that the disorder would prevent the employee from performing the particular job.'89 In light of these exceptions, an employer
conducting business in any state other than Rhode Island will have, at
best, very limited and, at worst, conflicting guidance regarding the utilization of genetic information. Remedies available to victims of genetic
discrimination vary as well, ranging from criminal misdemeanor
charges for the intentional disclosure of genetic information' to the im-

184. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1.
185. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3(ID; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.372(3).
186. See IOWA CODE § 729.6(7)(a)-(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.372(4)(a)-(b).
187. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:IV).
188. See OR. REv. STAT. § 659.227(6) (1997). When tests are conducted for the purpose of
determining qualifications, the statute proscribes that unless a court order says otherwise, the results must be destroyed as soon as the purpose is accomplished. See id. at § 659.715(6). Texas includes a similar provision in its statute. See TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.405 (West Supp. 1998).
189. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 48-a (McKinney 1996). Additionally, the New York employer is allowed to administer genetic tests "to determine the employee's susceptibility to potentially carcinogenic, toxic, or otherwise hazardous chemicals or substances found in the workplace
environment," provided that the employer does not terminate or adversely affect the employee's
terms of employment based on the results. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(19)(c)(3) (McKinney Supp.
1999).
190. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(b) (West 1997).
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position of monetary penalties for damages.1 9'
B. FederalResponse
On September 13, 1990, just months after the release of the joint
DOE and NIH publication outlining the goals for the first five years of
the Human Genome Project,' 2 Representative John Conyers (D-MI) introduced a bill, the Human Genome Privacy Act,' 93 with a warning that
the "'[plublic release of people's genetic information is a Pandora's Box
that is best left unopened.", 19 4 The limited scope of the bill was "[t]o
safeguard individual privacy of genetic information from the misuse of
records maintained by agencies or their contractors or grantees."' 95 The
introductory section of the bill, outlining the legislative findings and
purposes, gave a total tally of the amount of funding appropriated to the
DOE and the NIH in fiscal years 1989 to 1991,196 and warned that the
advances of the Human Genome Project had "greatly magnified the potential harm to individual privacy."' ' The bill proposed a ban on the
disclosure of genetic information to third parties without informed consent and allowed individuals to request the review and amendment of
their genetic records. 9 The exceptions to the requirement of informed
consent included the use of information by government employees "in
the performance of [their] duties";' 99 the disclosure of information to
medical professionals in connection with the care and treatment of a
specific individual;"" and disclosure for the purpose of "alleviat[ing]
emergency circumstances affecting the health or safety of any individual."20' The enforcement provisions assessed fines of up to $30,000,
eighteen months in jail, or both for the selling of genetic information

191. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-49 (vest Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-3 (1995).
192. See THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 103.
193. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong. (1990).
194. Richard A. Bornstein, Note, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A
Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 551, 579 (1995).
195. H.R. 5612.
196. See id. § 2(a)(6)-(7). The amounts given to the NIH and DOE, respectively, were: 1989 $28.3 million, $17.5 million; 1990 - $59.5 million, $26 million; and in 1991 - $108 million, $45
million.
197. Id. §2(a)(3).
198. See id. §§ 112 & 114(1).
199. Id. § 122(a).
200. See id. § 123(a).
201. l § 124(2).
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stolen from an agency,m but capped damage awards in suits against federal agencies at $1000.o
The major weaknesses of the bill were its broad exceptions and its
narrow purview. The exceptions were so numerous and generalized that
they effectively undercut the confidentiality protections that the bill was
enacted to protect.Y' The bill was completely silent on the requirements
of "informed consent," focusing primarily on what could be done with
the information once the consent had been obtained.*0 5 Lastly, the bill
only prohibited disclosure from government agencies, leaving the door
wide open for disclosure by medical2 personnel, insurance providers, and
private genetic research companies. 11
The Human Genome Privacy Act languished and finally expired
without enactment. There were no other federal bills proposed until
1995, when, within a period of five months, six separate bills were proposed.2 It is difficult to speculate as to what caused the clarion call for
Congress in 1995. One can surmise that it might have been the completion of the first five years of the Human Genome Project, or the declaration in March 1995 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") that genetic testing constituted discrimination under the
ADA,"0 8 or possibly even pressure from the rapidly developing state
legislation governing genetic information. In any event, the outpouring
of congressional proposals seemed to indicate that the government had
finally realized the necessity of federal action to establish at least a
minimum level of protection throughout the country."
Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) introduced the Genetic Privacy and
Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 in the Senate on November 15, 1995.210
202. See id. § 141(b).
203. See id. § 142(b)(1).
204. See Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, State Legislative Efforts to Regulate Use and
PotentialMisuse of GeneticInformation, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 637, 643 (1992).
205. See id.
206. See id.; see also Bornstein, supra note 194, at 580 ("The greatest weakness [of the bill]
was that it only prohibited disclosure from government agencies .... ").
207. See Bornstein, supra note 194, at 579 & n.110. The bills included the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995 (H.R. 2748, 104th Cong.); the Genetic
Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 (H.R. 2690, 104th Cong.); and the Genetic Fairness
Act of 1996 (S. 1600, 104th Cong.). All of the bills proposed the protection of the individual
against genetic discrimination. Three additional bills imposed nondiscriminatory restrictions on
health insurers: the Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996 (H.R. 3103, 104th
Cong.); the Working Families Health Access Act of 1996 (H.R. 3043, 104th Cong.); and the
Health Insurance Reform Act of 1996 (H.R. 3185, 104th Cong.).
208. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
209. See Burnett, supra note 168, at 530-31.
210. S. 1416, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill was drafted by George J. Annas, Leonard H.
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Representative Clifford Steams (R-FL) sponsored it in the House two
weeks later.2" ' The legislative findings, borrowing heavily from the ELSI
model, stressed the need to both "protect individual privacy and to
permit legitimate genetic research. '1 The section of the bill addressing
employment practices simply stated that
[n]o employer may seek to obtain, obtain, or use the genetic information of an employee or a prospective employee, or require a genetic
test of an employee or prospective employee, to distinguish between or
discriminate against or restrict any right or benefit3 otherwise due or
available to the employee or prospective employee.2
The bill fortified the employment provision by according the powers, procedures, and remedies set forth in sections 705 to 709 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to anyone alleging a violation.214 Unlike the
section governing insurance providers, the bill provided no exceptions
to the general ban for employers. Although the bill can be admired for
being the first to provide for the protection of genetic information, it
failed to address several other significant issues, including "the property
rights in the materials themselves and the apportionment
of benefits
15
from research and development using such materials.
Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), one of the chief proponents of
federal funding for the Human Genome Project, introduced an ambitious
bill into the Senate on June 24, 1996-the Genetic Confidentiality and
Nondiscrimination Act of 1996.6 The legislative findings in the bill
contrasted sharply from those of prior versions due to their foreboding
tone. The bill used phrases such as "[g]enetic information has been misused resulting in harm to individuals" and "[genetics] has the potential
to penetrate many aspects of life including employment, insurance, ...
and even one's self-perception. 21 7 The provisions for collection, storGlantz, and Patricia A. Roche of the Health Law Department of Boston University. See Michael
MJ. Lin, Note, Conferringa FederalPropertyRight in Genetic Material:Stepping into the Future
with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & IED. 109, 111 n.17 (1996).
211. H.R. 2690, 104th Cong. (1995).
212. H.R. 2690 § 2(a)(6).
213. Id. § 5(a).
214. See id. § 5(b).
215. Lin, supra note 210, at 128.
216. S.1898, 104th Cong. (1996).
217. Id. § 2(a)(3) & (5). In hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Senator Domenici justified the breadth of the bill by stating:
[W]hat is discrimination is going to be a very, very difficult issue, for some will claim
that you can discriminate because in discriminating, you will find valid information
upon which to make other decisions and other judgments, such as do you insure or not
insure, do you hire or not hire. These are enormous issues that we have never had be-
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age, and analysis of DNA samples were detailed and thorough with
specific instructions regarding the content of notices and authorizations. 211 The bill added an equally detailed provision governing disclosure, amendment, and destruction of genetic records.219 In section 104,
the bill boldly declared: "A DNA sample is the property of the individual."' The section that addressed discrimination by employers substantially followed the broad statement of the 1995 version (although it
clarifies the text significantly).' In short, the 1996 version of the Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act was comparatively
clear in its mandate and straightforward in its provisions-thereby ultimately guaranteeing its death on the Senate floor.
The "kinder, gentler" version of the Genetic Confidentiality and
Nondiscrimination Act made its appearance on March 11, 1997 under
the joint sponsorship of Senators Domenici, Christopher Dodd (D-CT),
and James R. Jeffords (R-VT);2n Domenici was, at the time, the Chairman of the Labor, Health and Human Resources Committee.2 3 In his
address, Senator Domenici stressed the need to begin the dialogue regarding the protection of genetic information.2 In declaring his continued support of the Human Genome Project, Senator Domenici warned
that "[w]hile all that is going on, the one thing we do not need, we do
not need an abuse of the information by either researchers, scientists,
insurance companies or the like, such that it would excite the American
people to turn against such research." In outlining the key provisions
of the revised bill, Senator Domenici flatly declared that "[tihis legislation will very simply preclude employers or health insurers from requesting or requiring genotype information as a condition of employment or health insurance." 6
fore us before.
Advances in Genetics Research, supra note 126, at 4.
218. See S. 1898 §§ 101-05.
219. See id. §§ 201-05.
220. Id. § 104(a).
221. See id. § 301(a). The bill states:
An employer may not seek to obtain, obtain or use the genetic information of an employee or a prospective employee, or require the collection of a DNA sample of an employee or prospective employee for analysis to distinguish between, discriminate
against, or restrict any right or benefit otherwise due or available to the employee or
prospective employee.
Id.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See S.422, 105th Cong. (1997).
See 143 CONG. REc. S2140 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
See id.
Id.at S2141.
Id. at S2142.
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After reviewing the newest version of the Genetic Confidentiality
and Nondiscrimination Act, one is hard pressed to find the flat preclusion that Senator Domenici alluded to in his sponsoring speech. The
legislative findings in the bill are clearly attenuated from the 1996 version. The language of existing misuse and damage to "self-perception"
has been replaced by laudatory statements about the benefits provided
by research in human genetics. 7 The lengthy requirements for the collection, storage, and analysis of DNA samples have been shortened and
simplified in the 1997 version.22 The declaration of an individual's
ownership of his genetic samples is missing altogether. The section addressing discrimination by employers is drastically different. The 1997
version stipulates:
An employer may request or require or use the genetic information of
an employee for the purpose of(1) permitting a genetically susceptible employee to avoid occupational exposure to substances with a mutagenic or teratogenic effect; or
(2) determining a genotype that is otherwise directly related to the
work and is consistent with business necessity. 2 9
In a presidential press briefing held on July 15, 1997, White House
spokesperson Mike McCurry predicted:
I think that the fact that the legislation is attracting bipartisan support,
that the chair of one of the relevant committees will have some things
to say that we hope will be positive about the bill bodes very well for
consideration of the legislation in this Congress, and hopefully in a
short while. 3
Although both McCurry and President Clinton spoke at length
about the possible impact of the new bill on health care providers, neither made any mention of the effect of the proposed legislation on employment.'
On January 20, 1998, Vice President Gore, in an address to the National Academy of Science, called for legislation that would bar an employer from discriminating against its employees on the basis of genetic
227. See S. 422 § 2(a)(2) ("Research in human and medical genetics continues to provide and
to predict immense health benefits to individuals and their families.").
228. See id. §§ 101-102.
229. Id. § 401(a).
230. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House Office of Communications, Press Briefing by Chris Jennings, Presidential Health Care Policy Advisor, and Mike McCurry, July 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 395750.
231. See id. However, the briefing addressed the testing for sickle cell anemia in the 1970s in
order to illustrate the use by insurance companies of genetic information to deny coverage. See id.
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information. Vice President Gore declared: "Miraculous scientific

achievements can help build an America that is healthier in body and in
spirit. That's no small feat. But science and society must always ad-

vance together, for neither can ever truly advance alone."" 3
C. Administrative Guidance
In the past, the EEOC, charged with the enforcement of both Title
VII and the ADA, has specifically excluded predisposition to disease as

a covered condition under its regulations. 2" It has further declined to
apply its protection to personality traits such as poor judgment, quick

temper, or irresponsible behavior.2 Genetic conditions that have been
cited in the legislative history as protected by the ADA include genetic
conditions like muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis,
dyslexia, hemophilia, and retinitis pigmentosa, but only once the conditions have shown overt debilitating symptoms."' These exclusions
would seem to indicate that asymptomatic genetic predisposition to
mental and physical diseases would fall outside the protection of the

Act.
On March 15, 1995, however, the EEOC issued regulations clarifying the definition of "disability" under the ADA. 6 Tucked within a
larger technical document was the EEOC's first statement prohibiting an
employer from discriminating against a worker on the basis of his genetic makeup. 237 The provision extends coverage to include "individuals
who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information

relating to illness, disease, or other disorders." 238 Dr. Francis Collins

232. Office of the Vice President, Vice President Callsfor Legislation on Genetic Discrinination,Jan. 20, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 7378521.
233. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS VmTH DISABILmEs Acr, at 11-2
(1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
234. See id.
235. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discriminationin Employment and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 29 Hous. L. REV. 23, 40 (1992).
236. See Rick Weiss, Gene DiscriminationBarred in Workplace, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1995,
at A3; see also Bornstein, supra note 194, at 581 ("The EEOC released guidelines which clarified
the definition of 'disability' under the ADA to include 'individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders."').
237. See Weiss, supra note 236, at A3; see also Abbey S. Meyers, EEOC Genetic Ruling
Protects Society, 4 EMPL. TEsTING L. & PL'Y REP. 103, 103 (1995) (stating that "[n]or can one
deny an applicant a job as long as the disability does not interfere with an employee's ability to do
the job").
238. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 2 EEOC COMPLANCE MANUAL § 902, at
902-45 (1995) (defining the term "disability").
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exulted, "[t]his solves a huge dilemma that's been sitting there without
an obvious solution ....This is wonderful news for the American public." 9 However, in hearings held before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources in July 1996, Dr. Collins tempered his enthusiasm. He noted that the EEOC interpretation fails to cover unaffected
carriers of recessive genes and that it does not prevent employers from
obtaining a general release from an applicant once there has been a preemployment offer.2" Bob Silverstein, counsel for Senator Tom Harkin
(D-Iowa), the chief sponsor of the ADA, noted the considerable difficulties in proving discrimination under this new regulation. To qualify
under the terms of the ADA, people must show not only that they have a
genetic defect, but also that they were regarded as disabled and discriminated against by an employer on account of that perception.24
Following the example of the state and federal legislatures, the
EEOC has effectively tempered its ban on genetic discrimination with
nebulous exceptions that threaten to swallow the rule, leaving the employer with no administrative regulations to guide it when it inevitably
confronts the legal dilemma of access to genetic information.
V. THE CASSANDRA COMPLEX
Confronted with the ethical and legal dilemmas of the genetic
workplace with little or no legislative or administrative guidance, the
employer of the new millennium will be left with few options for
avoiding legal consequences, whether the employer chooses to use the
new-found genetic information or not. To make matters more difficult
for the employer, genetic tests, painted by science as fairly clear-cut, are
not, at the current stage, precise predictors of the medical future of employees or job applicants. As illustrated by the failed experiments with
sickle cell testing, those carrying a gene may never show manifestations
of its effect.2 42 If the gene does manifest itself, its effects may vary
widely from individual to individual, making predictions of its manifestations a virtual guessing game.243
Additionally, gene reading, except in cases of single gene disease,
is an incomplete measurement, which does not take into account the
possibility of avoiding disease through environmental or personal health
239. Weiss, supra note 236, at A3.
240. See Advances in Genetics Research, supra note 126, at 15.
241. See id.at 15-16.
242. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Use of Genetic Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827 (1991) [hereinafter Council].
243. See id.
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factors.2' Virtually all employees and job applicants have hereditary
gene characteristics that predispose them to the onset of particular illnesses or diseases, and therefore, without considering the importance of

environmental or lifestyle factors, everyone can be considered a potential drain on the limited resources of an employer.25 Because of the inherent imprecision in current genetic technology however, it will be

difficult for an employer to make and justify employment decisions
based solely on the results of genetic tests.2 "
The time in which genetic knowledge will be most controversial
for employers will be the often lengthy phase between the discovery of a
genetic variation responsible for disease and the availability of treatment for that disease.27 It is during this time that loss of employment or

insurance, discrimination, or stigmatization is most likely to occur.248 In
this twilight period, the employer will need particular guidance in mak-

ing employment decisions on the basis of genetic information--guidance that, to date, has not been forthcoming from the government. This lack of guidance is at the root of the Cassandra complex,
where the employer has access to potentially devastating information
regarding an employee's future physical or mental health, but will be
244. See JERRY E. BISHOP & MICHAEL WALDHOLZ, GENOME: THE STORY OF THE MOST
ASTONISHING SCIENTIFIc ADVENTURE OF OUR TIME-THE ATTEMPT TO MAP ALL THE GENES IN
THE HUMAN BODY 303 (1990); see also Brokaw, supra note 35, at 321 (describing the importance
of considering family medical history or further investigating the person's chromosomes in a laboratory test). It has been speculated that all individuals possess five to seven lethal recessive genes,
plus an undetermined number of genes that indicate a predisposition to develop diseases based on
dealings with the environment, including diet, work, and other environmental factors. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern Genetics, 39
EMORY L.J. 665, 690 (1990).
245. See Rothstein, supra note 235, at 46-47. "We still don't understand even the simplest
kind of hereditary disease, such as Huntington's chorea, which is caused by the mutation of only
one gene. This summer researchers made the first major breakthrough in understanding how that
mutation might lead to the destruction of the brain-but this came four years after the discovery of
the mutation." Schoofs, supranote 160, at 18.
246. This difficulty will be most evident in genetic screening for psychological traits, where it
has been estimated that genes account for between 40 and 60 percent of the variations in personality and between 40 and 70 percent of the differences in IQ. See Schoofs, supra note 160, at 18. It
is, however, in the development of personality traits and intelligence that the environment exerts
its greatest influence. See id. Family background or life experience may, for example, determine
whether an "anxiety" gene will create a person who is clinically neurotic or a person who is merely
conscientious. See id. As David Lykken, a Minnesota researcher of personality variations in identical twins, postulated: "The psychopath and hero are twins on the same genetic branch, and the difference is experience." Id. For a discussion of the difficulties an employer will encounter in the
evaluation of psychiatric disorder in the workforce, see John D. Thompson, PsychiatricDisorders,
Workplace Violence and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 25 (1995).
247. See THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supranote 103, at 65-71.
248. See BISHOP & ,VALDHOLZ, supra note 244, at 304.
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449

unable to use it in making employment decisions due to the potential for
extensive litigation. The simple solution of ignoring the newfound genetic information will not be an option either. Not only will the employer be unable to ignore the obvious financial and safety benefits
which the tests will confer, but the very ability of an employer to foresee future genetic consequences will hold it responsible for any detrimental effects caused by the harmful manifestations of known genetic
conditions. In choosing either side of the coin, using or ignoring genetic
information, the employer is likely to lose.
A.

To Test or Not to Test?

Left to their own devices, most employers would understandably
welcome information that would prevent the hiring of employees who
would be disproportionately susceptible to illness. 29 It would be nayve to
ignore the fact that employment decisions, even in the pre-genetic era,
are partially influenced by information gleaned from the medical histories of applicants and their families.2' 0 The most obvious benefit to an
employer in having access to an employee's genetic information
(although the one least likely to be used as justification) is the potential
for cost containment."' Sick employees account for increased costs
caused by sick leave, absenteeism, workers' compensation expenses,
and lost goodwill. 2 Additionally, employees or dependents with illnesses account for greater costs in providing health and life insurance
for a workforce. For employers with self-insured plans, where the employer assumes direct responsibility for healthcare expenses, the ability
to predict catastrophic illness could3have a significant impact on the solvency of a company's health plan.2
249. See Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting,
and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 369, 371 (1994).
250. See id, at 371-72.
251. See Brokaw, supra note 35, at 326. Addressing the Washington Business Group on
Health, Tipper Gore reported that over six million Americans suffer from emotional or psychiatric
disabilities, accounting for a substantial portion of lost work time. See Beth Aspedon & John A.
Ricca, Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Analysis of Developments Relating to Disability Discrimination Law, in 2 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 415, 440-41 (1996). She
stated that depression alone accounts for an estimated $17 billion in lost productivity every year.
See id.
252. See Brokaw, supra note 35, at 326.
253. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1997). The ADA prohibits an employer from firing or refusing to hire an employee because of potential increases in future health care costs caused by the
disability of the employee or of the employee's dependents. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, supra note 233, at VII-9. However, the ADA leaves the door open for an employer to
tailor health benefits in response to insurance underwriting or actuarial risks, including the denial
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Another valid reason for an employer to access workers' genetic
information is to ensure the safety of the worker, the employer, and society at large. Employers concerned with the worker's safety and health
could use genetic testing and screening to provide information about
threats posed to employees and applicants by existing workplace conditions.' Because monitoring may disclose genetic damage that has already occurred, its use would be especially helpful as a means of preventing future damage25 The screening of applicants might disclose a
disease predisposition that may be triggered by workplace conditions,
allowing an employer to offer a valuable warning to job candidates of
the danger inherent in applying for certain positions.6
The employer's responsibility for providing a safe and healthy
workplace extends beyond the employee. An employer has a legal and
moral duty to ensure that employees are professionally, physically, and
psychologically capable of performing their duties.7 Co-workers and
members of the public could have a legal right to access genetic infor-

mation about a worker where the manifestation of his genetic variance
might put them at risk."5 Recognizing the safety concerns of both employers and third parties, the ADA has authorized employers to discriminate where a disabled individual poses a direct threat to the health
and safety of others." 9 This exception might justify an employer's deciof coverage for pre-existing conditions or for certain procedures or treatments. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12001(c)(2)(3) (1994);

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL,

supra note 233, at VII-9. For legisla-

tive history, see H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 137-138. See also Miller & Huvos, supra note
249, at 381-82 (describing employment practices the ADA does and does not permit). If genetic
predisposition can be cast as a pre-existing condition, an employer can design a health plan to exclude payment for any medical costs arising from a genetic condition diagnosed at the time of hire.
Alternatively, an employer can design a plan to exclude certain diseases that appear with greater
regularity in the genetic screening of its current employees. This capacity for the redesign of health
plans, effectively authorized by the ADA, will discourage high-risk applicants from seeking employment where the financial burdens they will incur due to health plan limitations are too large.
See id. at 382.
254. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENETIC TESTING IN ThE WoRKPLAcE 2
(1990).
255. See id. at 5.
256. See id.; see also Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 76 (1991) (explaining how genetic information
may be used to warn people with particular genetic dispositions to avoid certain jobs that may
trigger an illness).
257. See Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 256, at 94.
258. See id at 96.
259. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1997); Robert John Maseleck, Jr., Note, Employee Medical
Screening Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 653, 684
(1992); see also TECHNICAL ASSIsTANCE MANUAL, supra note 233, at 11-3 (detailing that an employee with a contagious disease could be discriminated against if they "posed a direct threat to
health or safety, if no reasonable accommodation could reduce or eliminate this threat").
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sion to exclude individuals with certain genetic traits from positions in
which the traits might create health and safety risks in the workplace.
In addition to the financial and safety benefits to the employer in
accessing genetic information, genetic testing may actually be mandated
by state legislation governing workers' compensation plans or by federal legislation such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSHA"'). 2 Workers' compensation is a state mandated system of
strict liability in which employers assume responsibility for employees'
work-related injuries or illnesses. 6 Compensation depends on medical
evidence that the employee's condition resulted from workplace exposure. 2 2 In many states, the responsibility of the current employer for
workplace injury or illness is mitigated by apportionment statutes that
divide liability for medical costs among all of the companies that could
have contributed to the employee's current condition.23 In order to insure an appropriate partitioning of financial responsibility, genetic
monitoring may be called upon to analyze an employee's health through
a succession of exposures to workplace hazards. Moreover, genetic
screening may be utilized to determine whether workplace exposure
played any part in the onset of the disease.'
The employer's refusal to institute genetic testing in the workplace
may also run headlong into OSHA's promotion of employer-conducted
medical exams. 5 OSHA mandates biological monitoring through
"periodic analysis of body fluids, tissues and excreta in order to measure
[the] impact of the body's exposure to chemical agents and to evaluate
the health risks these chemicals pose." 6 Some OSHA health standards,
such as those regulating arsenic, lead, and acrylonite, offer protection to
260. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994). OSHA was enacted in 1970 as a federal effort to assure a
safe work environment by investigating industrial diseases and their causal connections to the
workplace and by mandating preventive workplace safety practices. See Judith Richter, Taking the
Worker As You Find Him: The Quandry of Protecting the Rights As Well As the Health of the
Worker with a Genetic Susceptibility to OccupationalDisease, 8 ID. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
189, 206 (1997); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651 (containing the opening congressional statement of
findings and declaration of purpose and policy).
261. See Richter, supra note 260, at 193.
262. See Rothstein, supra note 32, at 1475-76.
263. See id. at 1477.
264. A number of states allow the use of pre-employment data in computing disability for
workers' compensation awards for occupational disease. See High-Risk Groups, supra note 46, at
153-54. Other states have provisions for second injuries or handicaps that allow the pre-existing
component of an occupational illness to be deducted from either the employee's benefit or the
employer's premium. See id.
265. See Richter, supra note 260, at 209-10.
266. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(7) (1994) (providing for the monitoring of employee
exposure for employee safety).
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sensitive employees by requiring medical surveillance of those exposed
to designated concentrations of the substances. 67 In particular, proponents of genetic testing in the workplace have pointed to a section in the
OSHA regulations governing cancer-causing agents.m This section
provides that "before an employee is assigned to enter a regulated area,
a preassignment physical examination by a physician shall be provided.
The examination shall include the personal history of the employee,
family and occupational background, including genetic and environmental factors. ''N 9 When confronted with conflicting medical and safety
requirements established under other federal laws, the ADA regulations
clearly state that the employer can follow these requirements without
violating the ADA.270 In light of the OSHA mandate and the ADA's concession, an employer may be found negligent for failing to provide genetic testing before assigning an employee to certain OSHA designated
positions.
Tempted by the financial benefits gained by identifying genetic
predisposition to disease, fearing the potential harm from the harmful
manifestations of genetic conditions, and confused by the government's
contradictory signals, the employer will most likely feel compelled to
institute genetic testing in the workplace. However, by doing so, the
unwitting employer will run directly into the legal and ethical contradictions inherent in the Cassandra Complex.
B.

"Heads You Lose": Liabilityfor Using Genetic Information

To date, there has not been a suit by an employee charging an employer with genetic discrimination, but it would be naYve to assume that
this relative quiet will continue once advances in genetic tests make
workplace screening more economical and accurate. Genetic discrimination has as yet to be defined by the courts, but has been identified by
commentators as "discrimination directed against an individual or family based solely on an apparent or perceived genetic variation from the
'normal' human genotype."2'
267. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1018, .1025, .1045 (1997); see also Rothstein, supra note 32, at
1427 (finding medical surveillance is required "for all employees exposed to concentrations above
the 'action level"').
268. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1003(g)(1)(i).
269. Id. (emphasis added); see also Richard Severo, FederalMandatefor Gene Tests Disturbs
U.S. Job Safety Official, N.Y. Tms.S, Feb. 6, 1980, at Al (describing the confusion of OSHA officials when asked to explain the genetic mandate in Part 1910, Title 29).
270. See TECHNImAL AsSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 233, at VI-5.
271. Paul R. Billings et al., Discriminationas a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J.
HuM. GENmcs 476, 476 (1992). Individuals at risk for genetic discrimination may include (a)
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An employer's chances of prevailing against a charge of genetic
discrimination can be predicted by examining judicial decisions under
current anti-discriminatory legislation, specifically the ADA. 2 The

ADA maintains that an individual is considered to have a disability if
that individual either has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) ...[been] regarded
273
' Asymptomatic individuals who manias having such an impairment."
fest a genetic predisposition to a physical or mental illness would most
likely be covered under the third classification of a disability if they are
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position in
question and are discriminated against on the basis of their genetic predisposition.
On March 3, 1987, the Supreme Court decided a landmark case
that clarified the requirements of the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's

asymptomatic individuals who carry a detrimental gene; (b) those who are heterozygotic for a
condition but will never be affected by it; (e)those who have genetic polymorphism (similar genes
that assume different forms); and (d) relatives of these individuals who have or are perceived as
having genetic conditions. See Miller & Huvos, supra note 249, at 372; see also Adrienne Asch,
Genetics and Employment: More DisabilityDiscrimination,in TlE HUMAN GENOmE PROjECT AND
THE FUTURE OF HEALTHCARE 158, 161 (Thomas H. Murray et al. eds., 1996) (commenting that
"people who never before were perceived as disabled will discover that their genetic characteristics
lead them to be viewed as disabled by others-notably employers and insurers").
272. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994). Enacted on July 26, 1990, the ADA was intended to
supplement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96) by extending coverage to private
sector employees. See Rothstein, supra note 235, at 32. The Act provides in part that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to ...hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). The Code of Federal Regulations explains that "[t]he ADA is a Federal antidiscrimination statute designed to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities
from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities." Appendix to part 1630-Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the American with Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R.§ 1630, app. at 336 (1997); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (governing forms of prohibited discrimination); TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 233, at VII-9 (discussing
health insurance and employee benefit plans).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added). Courts have further clarified that
[o]ne is regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if the individual (1) has
an impairment which is not substantially limiting but which the employer perceives as
constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) has an impairment which is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or
(3) has no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially
limiting impairment.
Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996); see also MacDonald v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing what constitutes a mental or physical
impairment).
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protected classification. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,27 4
the Court reviewed the case of an elementary school teacher who was
discharged from her job due to a history of tuberculosis.275 The Court
found that the school board violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 because "the fact that a person with a record of a physical
impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person
from coverage under [section] 504."276 The Court declared:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not
only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who
are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited
in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping
•
277
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.
A year prior to Arline, a district court in Florida upheld a charge of
discrimination filed by an epileptic employee who was terminated from
his position as a mechanic, even though he maintained that he had never
had a seizure. 27 The court concluded that "[i]t is unreasonable to deny a
person employment because of a fear of recurrence of a condition which
that person has asserted he has never had, when there is no evidence
showing that Plaintiff had ever had a seizure." 79
In Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals,o the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
a morbidly obese applicant for the position of attendant in a home for
the mentally retarded was unfairly denied employment because of the
employer's preconceptions of how her obesity would affect her performance.2l The court concluded that "denying an applicant even a single job ... due solely to the perception that the applicant suffers from a
physical [limitation] ...can constitute treating an applicant as if her
condition substantially limited a major life activity, viz., working. '' "z In

274. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
275. See iL at 276.
276. Id. at 286.
277. Id. at 284. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to
whether Ms. Arline was otherwise qualified for the job of elementary school teacher with a warning that it conduct an individualized inquiry of how her handicap might impact on the essential
functions of her position. See id. at 287-88. The Court also laid out the "well-established" basic
factors to be used in the inquiry. See id.
278. See Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927, 930 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
279. Id. at 935.
280. 10 F.3d 17 (lst Cir. 1993).
281. See id. at 28.
282. Id. at 26; see also Johnson v. American Chamber of Commerce Publishers, Inc., 108
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short, the focus of the "regarded as" inquiry is determined not on the
actual existence of an impairment, but on the attitudes of others to the
perceived impairment. 3 On the basis of these decisions, an employer
would most likely be held liable for disability discrimination if it made
an employment decision solely on the basis of a genetic test, without
producing further evidence that the employee was not otherwise qualified for the position.
Once a prima facie case of genetic discrimination was established,
an employer could have legal recourse in one of the defenses currently
available under the ADA to combat a charge of disability discrimination. These defenses include lack of knowledge, undue hardship, and direct threat to health and safety. Unfortunately, an analysis of court decisions addressing these defenses reveals that they would most likely be
unsuccessful in the genetic context.
An employer's first line of defense might be to prove that it had no
knowledge of the applicant's or employee's genetic condition. The federal regulations to the Rehabilitation Act mandate that an employer
must know about an existing specific disability before it can be liable
for failing to accommodate the disabled person's needs.' In cases involving "hidden" disabilities, courts have held that an employer cannot
be liable for disability discrimination if it had no actual or constructive
knowledge of an individual's disability." 5 In order to succeed under this
defense, an employer would need to affirmatively prove that it either
has no possibility of access to genetic information or that the hiring recF.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding employer liable for its refusal to hire a telemarketing applicant with 18 missing teeth because it perceived him as being unfit for the position); Katz v. City
Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that an employer had wrongfully discharged
the plaintiff after he had suffered a heart attack because of the employer's perception that the
plaintiff could not resume his normal duties); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (1997) (defining disability).
283. See MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also Francis v. City of Meriden,
129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) ("'This third prong is particularly important for individuals with
stigmatic conditions that are viewed as physical impairments but do not in fact result in a substantial limitation of a major life activity."' (quoting H. Rep. No. 101-485 part 2, at 53 (1990)).
284. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c) (1998).
285. See Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1012-13
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a former employee with a mental disability could not prevail in an
ADA claim where she failed to present any evidence of the employer's knowledge of her condition); see also Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 448 (1lth Cir. 1996) ("Vague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on notice
of its obligations under the ADA."); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding that "an employer cannot be liable under the ADA for firing an employee when it
indisputably had no knowledge of the disability"); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d
1178, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that an internist could not prove that a hospital suspended
him because of his mental illness absent evidence that the hospital knew of such illness).
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ommendation was made by an independent evaluator. The courts have
made it difficult for an employer to hide behind the recommendation of
a medical or occupational professional in denying opportunities to protected individuals. In EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines,26 the Southern District
Court of Texas found an employer liable in an ADA action brought by a
morbidly obese applicant who was denied employment on the basis of
the recommendation of a physician hired by the employer to perform
physical evaluations. The court concluded:
If an employer's relationship with a physician who conducts a
medical examination results in the discriminatory rejection of applicants protected by the ADA, the employer is liable for a violation of
the statute despite the involvement of a third party, the doctor, with
whom the employer had a professional arrangement.2 7
Based on these decisions, an employer may be able to avoid litigation for genetic discrimination by refusing to administer genetic tests
either directly or through a third party examiner. However, in light of
the benefits that will be available to the employer through testing and
the possible liabilities for failure to test,28 this will most likely be the
least acceptable defense.
If an employer has knowledge of an employee's or applicant's genetic information, it could attempt a second defense by proving that
providing accommodations for the disabled individual would pose an
undue hardship on the finances or operations of the organization. Two
areas where this defense has proven successful are when the accommodation would substantially interfere with the safe and efficient operations of the business and when the disability itself would preclude the
attainment by the employee of the licenses or clearances needed to perform his job.
In the first instance, where an accommodation would interfere with
the business' operations, the courts have specified that the considerations cannot be based on generalized fears about the potential effects of
a particular disability, nor about concern over high absenteeism or in-

286. 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
287. Id. at 982.
288. See infra Part IV.C.
289. When considering if an accommodation poses an undue hardship, the EEOC considers:
(1) the cost and type of the accommodation; (2) the financial resources of the facility; (3) the
overall financial resources of the entity (the parent company of the facility); (4) the kind of operation of the entity; and (5) the effect of the accommodation on the operations of the facility, including the impact on the facility's ability to conduct business and the productivity of other employees.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (1997).
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creased workers' compensation costs. 90 Employers have only been successful, if, after an individualized assessment of the individual's disability, the employer can provide direct evidence that retaining or accommodating the employee would cause harm to the operations of the
business. 29' Such evidence will normally be speculative when dealing
with asymptomatic genetic conditions. In the second instance of undue
hardship, where an employee's disability, or potential disability interferes with his ability to obtain needed licenses or waivers, the employer
can likewise mount a defense of business necessity or undue hardship.
In McDaniel v. AlliedSignal, Inc.,29 an employee lost his government
mandated security clearance partly because of mental illness.293 The

court found that the employer was justified in terminating the employee
because no accommodation could have insured the employee's regaining of his clearance. 2 4
A third employer defense, the legitimate concern with a direct
threat to the health and safety of the employee and of others caused by
290. See, e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10
F.3d 17, 27 (Ist Cir. 1993) (declining to consider increased absenteeism and workers' compensation claims in failure to hire obese applicant); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp.
763, 781 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (finding increased costs of health insurance insufficient reason to exclude employees from company plan); Turner v. City of Monroe, 634 So. 2d 981, 986 (La. Ct.
App. 1994) (refusing to consider potential increases in workers' compensation costs in employer's
decision not to allow employee with back injury to return to work). The EEOC clarifies that ADA
prohibitions apply to decisions "based on unsubstantiated concerns about productivity, safety, insurance, liability,attendance, costs of accommodation, accessibility, workers' compensation costs
or acceptance by co-workers and customers." TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 233,
at 1-11.
291. In EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Va. 1996), the court upheld the
termination of an epileptic salesperson prone to unpredictable seizures. The court held that "if an
employee causes vast disruption at the workplace, and if no possibility exists of cabining that disruption, then the employee is unqualified for the position. However, the degree of disruption
caused by the employee's disability must be substantial in order to render an employee unqualified." Id. at 428. Similarly, in Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ala. 1994), an
Alabama district court upheld the firing of a waitress prone to panic attacks when the restaurant
became crowded. The court concluded that "'[an employer or other covered entity is not required
to reallocate essential functions."' Id. at 779 (citing Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(o)) (alterations in original); see also Zevator v.
Methodist Hosp., Civ. A. No. H-94-859, 1995 WL 500637, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that an
employer is not required by the ADA to create a new position or reallocate essential functions).
292. 896 F. Supp. 1482 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
293. See id. at 1486.
294. See id. at 1490; see also Long v. Chicago Transit Auth., 979 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (finding that an applicant's failure to obtain a waiver from the Department of Transportation precluded a finding of discrimination on the part of the employer who refused to hire him
for a bus driver position). But see Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336, 341 (W.D.
Okla. 1994) (finding that employer had failed to conduct individualized assessment before terminating insulin-dependent diabetic who had been denied operator's license).
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the onset of a genetic condition, would likewise be difficult to sustain
without direct proof that the employee's genetic condition poses an immediate and direct threat to the welfare of others. 25 In order to prove a
"direct threat," the employer must be prepared to show a significant current risk of substantial harm and the harm must be identified and documented by objective medical and factual evidence.2 6 Additionally, even
if a significant risk of substantial harm exists, the employer must consider whether it can be eliminated or reduced below the level of direct
threat by reasonable accommodation.,
When confronted with this defense, courts are strict in requiring an
individualized and factually based assessment of the risk. This assessment must include: "(1) The duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm
will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.""29 Courts
would likely reject blanket exclusions based on potential risks posed by
the future manifestations of genetic conditions. 299
This judicial reluctance to credit unsubstantiated concerns can be
seen from the courts' conflicted treatment of another silent and unpredictable disability-mental illness. The line between an employee's privacy rights and an employer's responsibility for providing a safe workplace becomes particularly blurred in situations where an employee's

mental instability threatens the safety of her supervisor or co-workers.
In Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan,°° the plaintiff was
disabled from work as a result of "major depression adjustment disor-

295. The ADA permits employers to require that employees "not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994). The legislative history of the ADA and the EEOC regulations, however, have made it clear that the "direct
threat" claim is difficult to prove. See Direct Threat, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,745 (1991) (interpreting the
regulations to be codified as 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r)).
296. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1997); see also TEcHNIcAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note
233, at VI-3 (discussing when medical examinations may be administered by employers).
297. See TEcHNcAL AssIsTANcE MANuAL, supra note 233, at VI-3.
298. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
287-88 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (discussing the factors to be considered in the assessment of an elementary
schoolteacher with a history of tuberculosis); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 117072 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (examining the standards for the "direct threat" defense); Sarsycki, 826 F.
Supp. at 340 (discussing the factors to be considered in deciding whether a person is limited in "a
major life activity").
299. See Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1219-20 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding
that "blanket exclusions are to be given the utmost scrutiny, and are, as a general rule, to be discouraged").
300. 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 103 F.3d 35 (6th
Cir. 1996).
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der."' O'In the course of an examination by a company appointed psychiatrist, the plaintiff made threatening statements against her supervisor. The psychiatrist felt that the remarks were not threats, but were instead "expressions of the plaintiffs thoughts" and that she was not a
danger in the workplace."° However, the plaintiff was terminated upon
her return to work." 3 In an unexpected decision, the court found that the
statements, made in the private setting of a psychiatric evaluation, were
merely "homicidal ideations" consistent with the plaintiffs psychiatric
diagnosis, and did not disqualify her from employment.3 Conversely, in
Mazzarella v. United States Postal Service, 5 the District Court of Massachusetts held that the employer was justified in terminating an employee suffering from "'an explosive personality disorder.""' In this
case, also involving homicidal ideations against a supervisor,... the court
maintained that "[w]hile [plaintiff] did not physically harm or directly
threaten any individual, his admitted conduct did pose a threat to the
physical safety of other USPS employees."30 5 The court held that "'[ain
agency ... is not obliged to indulge a propensity for violence-even if
engendered by a 'handicapping' mental illness--to the point of transferring potential assailants and assailees solely to keep peace in the
workplace."' 3
The foregoing examination indicates that, when the courts face
cases involving genetic discrimination, they will be likely to find that an
employer's adverse actions, based on the uncertain and unpredictable
results of genetic tests, are violative of the rules and spirit of the ADA.

301. Id. at 640.
302. See id
303. See id
304. See id at 643.
305. 849 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994).
306. Id at91.
307. See id. at 92.
308. d at 95.
309. Id. (quoting Adams v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (D.D.C. 1989)); see also
Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Civ. A. No. 4:95-CV-0215-HLM, 1996 WL 735565, at *6 (N.D.
Ga. 1996) (upholding termination of employee suffering from bipolar disorder who exhibited
hostile and threatening behavior); Boldini v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 928 F. Supp. 125,
131 (D.N.H. 1995) (declaring employee with severe mental anxiety to be not otherwise qualified
for her job in light of her threatening behavior). For additional information on the effect of psychiatric disorders in the workplace, see generally Thompson, supra note 246 (discussing how the
ADA evaluates the impact of various psychiatric conditions on work performance).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:411

C. "Tails You Lose": Liabilityfor Not Using Genetic Information
If an employer decides that it will not make use of the genetic information readily and cheaply available in the twenty-first century, it
will be faced with the baffling flip-side of the Cassandra Complexliability in tort for injuries caused by the manifestation of genetic conditions of which the employer should have been aware. Under the tort
theories of negligent hiring, retention, and entrustment, employers are
held directly liable for injuries to third parties caused by the acts of their
employees, whether within or outside the scope of employment. Once
again, there are no decisions that have attributed tort liability to an employer for the harmful manifestations of an employee's genetic condition. In order to forecast judicial reaction, however, one can look to tort
cases involving an employee's violent criminal propensities and alcohol
or drug addiction, both hidden, potentially destructive conditions.
The tort theory of negligent hiring creates a cause of action from
the wrongful conduct of the employer in exposing third parties to a potentially dangerous employee.310 An employer can be liable for the torts
of his employee beyond the scope of employment "where it knew or had
reason to know of the [employee's] particular unfitness, incompetence
or dangerous attributes... and could reasonably have foreseen that such
qualities created a risk of harm to other persons.,, M In Tallahassee
Furniture Co. v. Harrison, the court upheld a personal injury suit

310. See 27 AM. JuR. 2D Employment Relationship § 472 (1996); see also Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 827 P.2d 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing a personal injury complaint
against a bar owner for the doorman's assault on a patron); Valdez v. Warner, 742 P.2d 517 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1987) (remanding the case and holding that a bar owner may be liable for the injuries of a
patron who was assaulted by a bar employee when employer had prior knowledge of employee's
history of assaults); Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (considering liability of employer when an employee with a known history of assault and battery and night-prowling
attacked plaintiff).
311. Di Cosaia v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982); see also Seariver Maritime, Inc. v.
Industrial Med. Servs., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1287, 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding medical provider
liable for negligent hiring of a doctor who failed to treat a sailor for an arm injury); Doe v. WTMJ,
Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (D. Kan. 1996) (declaring that "'liability [for negligent hiring] turns
on whether there are facts from which the employer knew or should have known of a particular
dangerous proclivity of an employee followed by employee misconduct consistent with such dangerous proclivity by the employee' (quoting McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo.
1995)) (alterations in original); Patton v. Southern States Transp., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 795, 801 (S.D.
Miss. 1996) (identifying the elements of negligent hiring cases); Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 435
(considering liability of employer when an employee with a known history of assault and battery
and night-prowling attacked plaintiff); F & T Co. v. Woods, 594 P.2d 745, 747 (N.M. 1979)
(finding that in order to be liable for employee's rape of customer, the employer must have been
able to foresee that hiring the employee would constitute an unreasonable risk of injury to others).
312. 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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brought by a customer who had been attacked by a furniture deliveryman employed by the defendant company. Although the employee had
a lengthy criminal record, the employer's normal hiring documentation
and procedures failed to turn up the convictions."4 The court stressed the
need for an employer to conduct an independent investigation, particularly in a situation where the employee is allowed to enter customers'
homes." ' In a similar case, Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments,31 6 a tenant
sued the realty company that hired the manager who raped her.317 As in
Tallahassee, the manager had a criminal record that had not been discovered through the employer's standard hiring process.318 The court
stated that "[l]iability is predicated on the negligence of an employer in
placing a person with known propensities, or propensities which should
have been discovered by reasonable investigation, in an employment
position in which ... it should have been foreseeable that the hired individual posed a threat of injury to others., 3 9 The court further determined that "[t]he scope of the investigation is directly related to the severity of risk third parties are subjected to by an incompetent
employee." 3'2
Although genetic predisposition does not carry with it the stigma of
a prior criminal record, it is not difficult to foresee the liability of an
employer who had easy access to records of an applicant's predisposition to mental illness or to other potentially dangerous conditions, and
could have, therefore, reasonably foreseen the possibility of harm. If the
predisposition becomes a reality, the door will be open to suits from
313. See id. at 747.
314. See id. at 749.
315. See id. at 751-52; see also Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 678 (D.D.C.
1956) (finding employer negligence in the rape of a tenant by an employee when the employer
knew that the employee was able to enter, after hours, the apartment of a young woman); Williams
v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that when a developer permitted an employee to have entry into townhouses, the developer was liable for not
obtaining information regarding the employee's background).
316. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
317. See id. at 909.
318. Seeid. at910.
319. Id. at 911.
320. Id. at 913. Courts appear somewhat conflicted over the amount and type of information
that an employer should uncover to insure that an employee is capable of safely performing the
job. The court in Edwards v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 298 S.E.2d 600, 601 (Ga. App. 1982), held
as sufficient the employer's standard process of hire, including several applications and a thorough
background check. The court in Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979), insisted that the employer should have accessed the employee's criminal record from
private investigative agencies. But see Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1322
(Colo. 1992) (holding that an employer's duty of investigation in hiring truck drivers does not extend to conducting a search into an applicant's criminal history).
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third parties arguing that the employer did not take sufficient investigative steps to prevent tortious injury caused by the employee's illness.
For example, an employer could be held responsible for the harm caused
by an employee who was hired in a truck driver or security guard position if the employee's genetic tests revealed a predisposition for diseases that cause lapses of consciousness or incapacity. In all cases, the
employer's ability to foresee injury to third parties, predicated by the
frequency and manner of the employee's contact with the public, will
likely be a significant factor considered by the courts in assessing li32
ability. 1
Negligent retention, a variant on the traditional tort of negligent
hiring, is based on the theory that an employer has a continuing duty to
retain only those employees who are fit and competent. 3 2 While under
the theory of negligent hiring the issue of liability turns on the adequacy
of the employer's pre-employment investigation, in negligent retention
it depends on whether the employer becomes aware or should have become aware of problems with a current employee, yet fails to take further action. 32 Additionally, an employer might be liable for negligent
retention if "the employer reasonably should have foreseen that its precautions were inadequate to protect third parties from an unreasonable
risk of harm resulting from a recurrence of the employee behavior of
which the employer had prior notice.''32 In Favorito v. Pannell,3'2 the
First Circuit reviewed the claim of negligent retention brought by a
yacht's passengers against the yacht's owners for injuries caused by the
reckless driving of the owners' engineer.3M In determining the owner's
liability, the court maintained that the employer could be held liable if it
"(1) had 'reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or
dangerous attributes of the employee' and (2) 'could reasonably have
foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to other persons.' ' 327
The court held that "a negligent retention claim does not lie absent sufficient evidence ... that the employer reasonably should have foreseen
321. See 27 Am.JUR. 2D Employment Relationships § 474 (1996). "The scope of the employer's duty in exercising reasonable care in a hiring decision will depend largely on the anticipated degree of contact that the employee will have with other persons in performing his or her
employment duties." Id.
322. See id.
§ 476.
323. See Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
the employer liable for the murder of an employee by a co-worker where an employer had knowledge of the co-worker's criminal propensity and retained him in his position).
324. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationships § 476.
325. 27 F.3d 716 (1st Cir. 1994).
326. See id. at 718.
327. l at 719 (quoting DiCosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d'508, 516 (N.J. 1982)).
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that its precautions were inadequate to protect persons ... from an unreasonable risk of harm resulting from a recurrence of the employee be-

havior of which the employer had prior notice." '

The doctrine of negligent retention may be particularly pertinent

for employers who may conduct routine genetic monitoring of employees in the workplace. According to this theory, once the employer is put
on notice of an employee's condition or propensity, it may be liable for
any subsequent injury to third parties caused by the employee's condition.
Negligent entrustment occurs "where the employer supplies an
employee with a chattel knowing the employee to be likely ... to use it

in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and
' This theory of liability is often used in cases where the emothers."329
ployer has allowed an incompetent employee to use a motor vehicle,
causing subsequent injury to third parties.33
In Cherry v. Kelly Services, Inc.,331 for example, an injured motorist
sued the employer due to an accident caused by a temporary truck
driver.332 The court held: "The fact that [defendant] uncontrovertably

328. la1 at 720; see also Edwards v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 298 S.E.2d 600, 603 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982) (finding employer liable for employee's embezzlement of a customer since it should
have been aware of employee's "dangerous propensities"); C.K. Sec. Sys. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 223 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. CL App. 1976) (holding employer liable for employee's forgery
because it had knowledge of employee's predilection to steal).
329. 27 AM. JuR. 2D Employment Relationships§ 477. In order to succeed in a claim of negligent entrustment, a plaintiff would need to show: (1) that the employee was incompetent, inexperienced or reckless; (2) that the employer knew or had reason to know of the employee's condition or proclivities; (3) that the chattel was entrusted; (4) that the entrustment created a significant
risk of harm to the plaintiff; and (5) that the negligence of the employer proximately caused the
harm to the plaintiff. See Graham v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1124, 1134 (D.
Mass. 1996) (listing the elements necessary for the plaintiff to succeed in a claim of negligent entrustment in a suit involving injuries caused by trucker hired by the employer); see also Vaidya v.
Xerox Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-547, 1997 WL 732464, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (listing elements needed
to establish a tort of negligent entrustment).
330. See Vaidya, 1997 WL 732464, at *2 (involving action against employer for permitting
driver with suspended license to operate a large commercial vehicle at excessive speeds, injuring
plaintiffs); Mitchell v. Gilbert Commonwealth, Inc., No. CIV.A. 95-2844, 1996 WL 583172, at *1
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (involving negligent entrustment suit against employer for entrusting car to employee who was near retirement age and had not slept the night before the accident); Carolina Cable Contractors, Inc. v. Hattaway, 487 S.E.2d 53, 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (suing trucking company
for injuries caused by truck driver who was intoxicated); Ed Sherwood Chevrolet, Inc. v.
MeAuley, 298 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. CL App. 1982) (charging automobile retailer for injuries caused by
salesman with poor driving record); Christiansen v. Silfies, 667 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (involving charge of negligent entrustment against employer for death caused by employee
tractor-trailer driver with poor driving record).
331. 319 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. CL App. 1984)
332. See id. at 464.
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proved that it had no actual knowledge of any pattern of reckless driving
by [the employee] does not mean that [it] carried its burden of proving
' The court went on to explain
that it exercised ordinary care."333
that the
employer must look into all available information in order to satisfy its
burden of ordinary care. 3 4 As with cases involving negligent hiring and
retention, states vary as to the level of care needed to satisfy this burden.
In addition to liability toward third parties for injuries caused by an
entrustee, an employer may be held liable for injuries caused to the entrustee himself. In Caseboltv. Cowan,335 the Supreme Court of Colorado
held an employer liable for injuries sustained by an employee for allowing him to drive the company car while intoxicated.336 The court concluded that "the risk presented by the entrustment, or the continuation of
an entrustment, of a vehicle to a person likely to drive it while inebri' If an employer has
ated is an unreasonable one."337
the ability to access
genetic tests revealing a condition that might impact upon an employee's driving abilities, it might be found negligent for failing to exercise its ordinary duty of care by not acting on the test results.
In light of the tort doctrines of negligent hiring, retention, and entrustment, it would seem that an employer may be held liable for its
failure to act upon the results of genetic information, particularly in circumstances in which this information was readily accessible. Case law
seems to indicate, therefore, that an employer may be liable under the
ADA for acting on the results of an employee's genetic test. Paradoxically, an employer will be held responsible under tort theories for not
acting on the results of genetic tests. Caught in this no-win situation, an
employer would reasonably look to both federal and state legislatures or
to administrative regulatory agencies for guidance in solving the Cassandra Complex. Unfortunately, as previously examined, this guidance
varies broadly from state to state, and Congress, to date, has failed to issue any legislation to assist the employer with this baffling dilemma.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Caught between the increasing momentum of genetic research and
the inertia of Congress, an employer must begin now to prepare for the
333. Id
334. See id.
335. 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992).
336. See id. at 360.
337. Id. at 362; see also Sanchez v. San Juan Concrete Co., 943 P.2d 571 (N.M. Ct. App.
1997) (declining employer's motion for summary judgment in negligent entrustment action by
employee for injuries incurred while driving company truck while intoxicated).
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genetic information unleashed on the workplace. If an employer chooses
to ignore the information, science and technology will continue to flood
the market until it will no longer be financially and legally practical to
do so. As Robert Oppenheimer declared in his testimony on the role of
science in the development of the atom bomb: "'If you are a scientist,
you cannot stop such a thing. If you are a scientist, you believe that it is
good to find out how the world works; that it is good to find what the
realities are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the greatest
possible power to control the world.""'33 Whether one considers the Hu' or a "Holy Grail,"' 0its effects
man Genome Project a "Pandora's box"339

have only begun to impact upon industry.
An employer can begin to prepare for the future by understanding
the balancing process needed to successfully navigate in the genetic
workplace. In fashioning policies and procedures addressing genetic
testing and discrimination, an employer can be guided by a set of generally applicable public policies drawn from existing legislation and ba-

sic societal morality."4

One of the primary responsibilities for an employer is to ensure as

far as possible a safe and productive work environment for all employees.34' Unfortunately, workers and their families have often been the first
to subsidize new industrial processes with their health and even their
lives? 43 Protection of the worker may mean that an individual should not
338. George J. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythology,
39 EMORY L.J. 629, 659 (1990). Likewise, James Watson declared: "'We can have at our disposal
the ultimate tool for understanding ourselves at the molecular level ....The time to act is now."'
George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, The Major Social Policy Issues Raised by the Human Genome
Project,in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHics As GuiDEs 3, 4 (George J. Annas & Sherman
Elias eds., 1992).
339. See Bomstein, supra note 194, at 579 (comments by Representative John Conyers in
introducing the Human Genome Privacy Act).
340. See COOK-DEEGAN, supranote 104, at 88 (describing the Holy Grail analogy first introduced by Walter Gilbert, Nobel Laureate and main proponent of the Human Genome Project).
Cook-Deegan explained: "The Grail myth conjured up an apt image; each of the Knights of the
Round Table set off in quest of an object whose shape was indeterminate, whose history was obscure, and whose function was controversial-except that it related somehow to restoring health
and virility to the Fisher King, and hence to his kingdom."Id.
341. See Genetic Screening of Workers, supra note 86, at 99 (testimony of Mark Rothstein).
342. See id.
343. See High-Risk Groups, supra note 46, at 31. In his statement to the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, Sheldon Samuels said: "Witness silicosis in King Solomon's mines,
lead and mercury poisoning among potters and hatters at the beginning of the industrial era, cancer
among dyeworkers in the prior and in this generation, and the widespread human devastation seen
today in pesticides and plastics manufacture." Id. But Samuels conceded: "[NMevertheless, we cannot and should not foreclose change. We need to control, not to stop, the dynamics of our society."
Id.
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be assigned to a job if it is not possible to assure his own safety or the
safety of others.3 In an open and mutual dialogue between management
and workers, legitimate issues must be explored, including valid
evaluations of the physical and mental requirements of jobs, and of the
realistic potential harm for the worker and his offspring. 345
An employer must conscientiously try to identify the health dangers in its workplace, using available findings from other employers and
governmental agencies.3 This information must be made clearly and
completely available to workers to allow them the opportunity to determine whether a risk should or should not be assumed. 47 Employers

should notify applicants of all the possible risks inherent in the position
they are seeking and that genetic susceptibility might increase their
risk. 3"4 The final choice regarding assumption of risk should remain with
the employee or the applicant, unless co-workers or third parties will
also share the risk. 9 Employers should consult attorneys to assist them
in the drafting of a waiver of responsibility should the worker decide to
assume the risk despite the warnings of future potential harm. This will
be particularly complicated in situations where the risk might involve
future reproductive capacity or harm to a fetus.
In the best of circumstances, an applicant or employee would be referred to his or her own physician to assess genetic predisposition so
that confidentiality could be preserved.35 The results of genetic analysis
344. See id. at 8 (statement of Ernest E. Dixon, Tabershaw Associates, Rockville, Maryland).
345. See id.; GEwiRTH, supranote 254, at 7.
346. See High-Risk Groups, supra note 46, at 17.
347. Mark A. Rothstein outlines six recommendations to minimize dangers of genetic hazards
in the workplace:
(1) all employees subject to possible reproductive hazards must be informed in writing
of the specific substances involved;
(2) employers must advise employees in writing of the possible short-term and longterm effects of exposure and provide them with available literature on the substances
and the nature of the hazards;
(3) no employer may condition employment on the employee being sterilized;
(4) employers must make pregnancy and fertility testing available;
(5) medical removal protection must be provided for employees attempting to become
parents, especially pregnant employees; and
(6) employers must make ongoing efforts to reduce exposure levels through improved
control technologies, substitution of substances and better personal protection equipment.
Rothstein, supra note 32, at 1465 (footnotes omitted).
348. See Council,supra note 242, at 1829.
349. See id.; see also High-Risk Groups, supra note 46, at 9 (testimony of Ernest E. Dixon)
("I do not believe that workers should be permitted to assume the risk of bodily harm just because
they are shielded from the risks of financial loss.").
350. See Council,supra note 242, at 1829.
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conducted by employer-contracted physicians should be retained in a
location other than the employer's work site and should be destroyed
immediately after their purpose has been accomplished.
If the employer decides to conduct genetic screening in the workplace, it must ensure that the tests utilized are safe, valid, and reliable."'
Occupational physicians must be instructed to make assessments based
on testing measures that reliably predict the probability and extent of the
harm foreseen. To avoid liability, occupational qualifications must be
bona fide and reasonably related to performance on the job. Empirical
data must be gathered to demonstrate that the genetic condition would
expose the worker to an unusually elevated susceptibility to occupational injury or illness. 52 Decisions based on stereotypes or presumptions are illegal, as are those based on racial, ethnic, or class based statistics. There must be an individualized assessment of each applicant or
employee's ability to perform the specific job with no harmful results.353
The possibility of genetic testing must be disclosed to employees
and applicants, and informed consent must be obtained before any testing occurs. The written authorization consenting to genetic screening
must be drafted in language understandable to the worker and should
contain a clear statement that all genetic testing and monitoring is voluntary. 4 It should identify the specific genetic test to be conducted, the
information that could be derived from the analysis, and the ways in
which the genetic information will be used.355 Additionally, procedures
for revocation of consent and destruction of genetic samples should be
documented and discussed with the worker. Lastly, the employer should
provide the services of a genetic counselor to the worker to discuss the
meaning of the test results and to assist the worker with difficult moral

351. "Reliability" has been defined as "the degree to which a test consistently measures the
same thing" and "validity" as "whether or not the test is measuring what you think it is measuring." Genetic Screening of Workers, supra note 86, at 43. A technically valid genetic test must
meet at least the following criteria: (a) it must be appropriately sensitive to the genetic trait or to
the genetic damage and it must be appropriately specific for that trait or that damage; (b) there
must be sufficiently high prevalence of the trait or of the damage in the population, in part to justify the cost of the testing program and in part to give the test an appropriately high predictive
value; (c) there must be a significantly higher risk of those with the trait or the damage developing
the illness than of those without the trait or damage developing the illness. See Baruch A. Brody,
The Ethics of Genetic Testing in the Workplace, in 3 GENETIc MoNrroRING AND SCREENING IN
THE WORKPLACE 2 (1990).
352. See Council, supranote 242, at 1829.
353. See Genetic Screening of Workers, supra note 86, at 99.
354. See Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, S. 422, 105th Cong.

§ 101(b).
355. See id.
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and ethical choices including the communication of the genetic findings
to his or her family.3 5
Protecting employees from occupational injury may be achieved by
offering workers the opportunity to be monitored for exposure to potential toxins and for adverse health effects from the toxins.357 If the tests
indicate that the employee has exceeded the recommended exposure, the
employee should be transferred to a safer job without loss of salary,
benefits, seniority, or opportunities for advancement.35 In order to justify transferring a "hyper-susceptible" worker instead of reducing risks
in the workplace for all workers, the employer would need to show that
the costs of improving safety are extraordinary relative to other costs of
production.359 An employer would be wise to establish procedures for
resolving potential conflicts created by the transfer of a worker or the
restructuring of positions if there is no formal avenue for grievance in
its workplace.
Finally, the employer must analyze the provisions of the legislation
of its particular state to ensure that its policies do not conflict with enacted laws regarding genetic testing in the workplace. Most importantly,
through professional organization and in conjunction with organized labor, employers must lobby to ensure that adequate federal legislation
and administrative guidelines are established to provide effective guidance to companies faced with ethical and legal dilemmas.
To avoid Cassandra's fate, employers will need to squarely face the
economical, legal, and ethical ramifications of the Human Genome
Project and, in conjunction with workers, forge a new understanding
that will respect the privacy and autonomy of the worker as well as the
rights of the employer to conduct its business safely and economically.
POSTSCRIPT
Since this Note was first written, many developments have occurred in the science and the politics of genetic testing. Below are a few
highlights:
356. See id.

357. See Council, supra note 242, at 1829. In his testimony before the Subcommittee of Investigations and Oversight, Ernest Dixon, specialist in occupational medicine stated: "The benefits
in worker health protection afforded by properly and fairly conducted health surveillance far outweighs any risk that discriminatory decisions might pose." High-Risk Groups, supra note 46, at 89. He added: "However, there are ethical and social dilemmas to be addressed. When it comes to a
health problem of an individual posing a hazard to other individuals or property, there can never
be a decision to accept the latter." Id. at 9.
358. See Council,supra note 242, at 1829.

359. See id.
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FEBRUARY 3, 1998: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a
summary judgment motion granted to the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories in a suit by current and former administrative and clerical employees. 6 The employees alleged that in the course of their mandatory employment entrance examinations and without their knowledge or
consent, Lawrence tested their blood and urine for "intimate medical
conditions"-specifically, syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy. 61 In
a decision that may have a significant impact on genetic testing in the
workplace, the court held that the fact that employees signed medical
releases authorizing the collection of blood and urine did not imply their
'
consent to "investigate the most intimate aspects of [their lives]."362
Concluding that there are "few subject areas more personal and more
likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one's health or genetic
make-up,""3 3 the court remanded the case to the district court for adjudication '6 The Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, funded through the DOE,
is one of the National Laboratories involved in research for the Human
Genome Project. 65
MAY 9, 1998: Dr. Craig J. Venter, President of the non-profit Institute for Genomic Sciences in Rockville, Maryland, and Michael W.
Hunkapiller, President of the Applied Biosystems division of the
Perkins-Elmer Corporation of Norwalk, Connecticut, announced that
they were joining forces with the aim of deciphering the entire human
genome within three years, far faster and cheaper than the federal Human Genome Project 3 6 Ethicist Dr. Arthur Caplan of the University of
Pennsylvania 367 commented: "The question is, can the moral and legal
questions be addressed if the largest scientific revolution of the next
century is going to be done under private auspices?"3' 6
MAY 21, 1998: In testimony before a Senate committee, Senator
Pete Domenici said that Congress would be "irresponsible" by not
making progress in protecting individuals from misuse of their personal
genetic information. 69 Senator Domenici, the author of the Genetic
360. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).
361.

See id. at 1264.

362. Id. at 1268.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at 1269.
See id. at 1275-76.
See How BIG, How FAST?, supranote 106, at 100.
See Nicholas Wade, Scientist's Plan: Map All DNA Within 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May

10, 1998, at 1.
367. See id.
368. Id.
369. See Office of Senator Pete V. Domenici, Domenici: Nation Needs Genetic Privacy Pol-

icy (May 21, 1998) (press release on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, testified on stalled
efforts in Congress to ensure privacy fights for individual genetic information. Senator Domenici commented: "'The Human Genome Project stands to be one of our greatest scientific and medical achievements.
But its wonderful promise may never be fully realized if the public is
afraid of what someone else will do with their information ... .,,,370
JUNE 3, 1998: At a meeting in Warrentown, Virginia, the NIH and
the DOE unveiled their new five year draft plan for the Human Genome
Project, emphasizing that the ELSI planning group will be charged with
analyzing and addressing "'the implications of completing the first human genome sequence and identifying variation.' ' '37' Additionally, the
NIH and DOE in the draft committed to exploring "'how new genetic
knowledge challenges
or affirms long-standing philosophical and theo372
logical traditions."
JUNE 8, 1998: The DOE's Human Genome Project funded the Chicago Judicial Conference for Genetics in the Courtroom, to educate
judges in preparation for "cases brought because of the Human Genome
Project." 37 3 Dr. Franklin M. Zweig, president of the Einstein Institute
commented that because Congress and the states had failed to enact
anti-discriminatory legislation, "the judicial branch of government will
374
bear the primary responsibility when the law and science intersect.
Dr. Daniel W. Drell, director of the ELSI Program of the Human
Genome Project stated: "'The trend is clear that a lot of these kinds of
'"3175
cases are headed toward the courts ....
SEPTEMBER 3, 1998: The Labor-HI-S-Education spending bill allocated $250 million in funding in fiscal year 1999 for the National Human Genome Research Institute, a further increase from the 1998 appropriation level of $217 million. 6
SEPTEMBER 14, 1998: Leaders of the worldwide Human Genome
Project announced a sharp acceleration in the Project's schedule, agreeing to complete a "rough draft" in three years and a definitive map by

370. Id.
371. Human Genome Project: Technology Development for Creation of Complete cDNA LibrariesMust Be Supported By NHGRJIDoE,"THE BLUE SHEET," June 3, 1998, at 5, 6.
372. Id.
373. Patricia Manson, Judges Huddle over the Future: Gene-Based Law, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., June 8, 1998, at 1.
374. Id
375. Id.
376. See CapitolHill: NHGRI Increaseof 15% Provided in Senated Spending Bill Should Be
Greater,ChairmanStevens Says, "THEBLUE SHEET," Sept. 9, 1998, at 2, 2.
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2003."'7 In addition to shortening their timetable, gene researchers added
another goal: "They will begin compiling a detailed catalogue of genetic
variations among people, another endeavor where private companies
had threatened to leapfrog publicly funded researchers."378 This database
will help reveal "why some people are smarter than others, why some
are tall and some are short, why some run fast and others play a mean
game of chess, why some get cancer and others get depressed, why
some die young and others live to a ripe old age."' 79 This new timetable,
if adhered to will provide the publication of the first gene map in 2003,
exactly fifty years after James Watson and Francis Crick described the
fundamental structure of DNA.38°
Joanne Seltzer*

377. See Justin Gillis, Scientists Speed Up Timetable for Mapping Human Genes, WASH.
PoST, Sept. 15, 1998, at A2.
378. Id
379. Id.
380. See id.
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